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JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal by virtue of
a timely notice of appeal filed by defendant Don R. Gaskill
(hereinafter "Mr. Gaskill") pursuant to Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, from a final judgment of the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, and pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(h).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Statement of Issue.

Whether it was reversible error for the

district court to affirm the commissioner's conclusion that it is
inequitable on these facts to allow Mr. Gaskill to assert the
defenses of waiver or estoppel?

(Record at 90 f 102f 114).

Standard of Appellate Review.

Because the court's

conclusion barring assertion of waiver and estoppel is based in
equity, it is the prerogative of this court to review both the
facts and the lawf and to overturn the district court's ruling
where the evidence clearly preponderates against the trial
court's conclusion.

Ross v. Ross, 592 P.2d 600, 602 (Utah 1979).

The court concluded that Mrs. Gaskill did not waive her right to
alimony.

Because this conclusion is a question of law, the trial

court is accorded no particular deference.
reviewed by this court for correctness.
County, 784 P.2d 1152 (Utah 1989).

Its conclusions are

Kelson v. Salt Lake

The court of appeals will not

disturb the trial court's findings of fact on the issue of the
legal doctrine of waiver, unless such findings are clearly
erroneous.

Hinkley v. Hinkley, 815 P.2d 1352, 1353 (Utah App.

1991) (citation omitted).

"Findings of fact will be regarded as
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clearl y erroneous only i f they are so ] acking i n support as to be
against the clear weight of the evidence.'"

j i.

Id. (citation

Whether ~ *~ —*** ^eversiblo nrror for the

Statement of Issue.

district court to deny an amendment •

* ^ ^:^*,^

pro tunc based 01 i fax lure; l.o stinw

decree nunc
*"" ul

circumstances not original ] y contemplated in the decree, 0:1
whethei: the appr opria te standard ior a nunr pro tunc order :i s a
finding of "good cause" pursuant -t-^ ut«ih Code Ann. l? i(J-4a 1 ,
Standard of Appellate Review,
< | I H - \ S 1 in mi

I

I iii.< ,

I lii

II 1 mi i l l

Because this issue presents a

i'i HI i I '

1 1 M 111J

i 1 mi * I ui) 1 uii!) n 11 o ii< c o r d e d

no particular deference and ai: e reviewed by thi s coin: t for
correctness.
•

)

Kelson v. Salt Lake County, 7 84 P.2d 1152 (Utah

.

ill. Statement of Issue,

If Mrs. Cask 1 1] i s entitled to a

judgment, whether the judgement should be vacated and the trial
court instructed 1.1. enter judgment for the appropriate amount.
Standard of Appellate Review,

Finding*-

r

;

1,4

be

1: egar
suppor * >

-, i t m e ciear weight

: •••

r, \.he evidence

Hinklev v. Hinkley, 815 P.2d 1352, 1353 (Utah App. 1991)
)

.

'

•

•

•

•

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES

Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-4a-l:
A .-;;:$ having jurisdiction may, upon its finding of good
cause '*.--.;: aivina °f such notice as may be ordered, enter an
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order nunc pro tunc in a matter relating to marriage,
divorce, legal separation or annulment of marriage.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-12-22:
Within eight years:
An action upon a judgment or decree of any court of the
United States of or any state or territory within the United
States.
An action to enforce any liability due or to become due,
for failure to provide support or maintenance for dependent
children.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 15-1-1(2):
Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different
rate of interest, the legal rate of interest for the loan or
forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action shall be
10% per annum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Plaintiff/Appellee Mrs. Gaskill obtained a judgment in the
amount of $81,239.36 against Defendant/Appellant Mr. Gaskill for
delinquent alimony on August 28, 1992.
originally entered December 30, 1976.

The Decree of Divorce was
In lieu of formal service

Mr. Gaskill was sent a consent and waiver and a copy of the
complaint.

Mr. Gaskill altered the consent and waiver to omit

his consent to entry of a default judgment on the issue of
alimony.

Mr. Gaskill was given no further notice of the

proceedings or entry of judgment.
In 1978, after being served with an order to show cause for
failure to pay alimony, Mr. Gaskill immediately raised the
defense of mistake or error in entry of the judgment, pursuant to
Rule 60(b)(7), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
failed to respond to his defense.

Mrs. Gaskill

The court ordered both parties

3
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to file briefs.

Thereafter, Mrs. Gaskill failed to submit a

memorandum in support of her petition as requested by the court,
and the matter was dismissed seven months later for failure to
prosecute.

Mrs. Gaskill did not seek relief from the dismissal.

Mrs. Gaskill has not brought another action to enforce the
judgment for over twelve years since she allowed the action in
1978 to be dismissed.
Proceedings and Disposition Below
This is an appeal from a judgment in the amount of
$81,239.36.

The judgment is based upon nonpayment of alimony in

[ the amount of $450 per month for eight years or 96 months.

All

evidence was submitted based upon the record and affidavits.

The

commissioner made his ruling by reviewing affidavits and
memorandum.

The District Court summarily affirmed.
Statement of Facts

1.

Mrs. Gaskill filed for divorce from Mr. Gaskill in the

Utah Third Judicial District Court, on or about September 8,
1976. (Record at 2-4).
2.

Mr. Gaskill and Mrs. Gaskill were separated at the time

Mrs. Gaskill commenced the divorce action in Utah.

Mr. Gaskill

lived in California, and Mrs. Gaskill lived in Utah.

(Record at

2, 18).
3.

Paragraph 8 of the complaint stated, "That the

defendant pay the plaintiff $700.00 per month alimony for a
period of 30 months, after which time the defendant has agreed to
pay the plaintiff $450.00 per month for the remainder of her
4
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life, providing, however, that should the plaintiff remarry all
alimony payments shall cease forthwith."

(Record at 3) (emphasis

added).
4.

Mr. Gaskill was sent a "Consent and Waiver" form in

that proceeding, to which he made the alteration, "Omit #8 on
Complaint," in his own handwriting and added his signature, on or
about September 8, 1976.
5.

(Record at 6 ) .

Mr. Gaskill signed the consent and waiver with the

understanding that paragraph 8, concerning alimony, would be
omitted.
6.

(Record at 26).
The consent and waiver form does not state that

defendant has, or knows that he should have, consulted with legal
counsel before signing the waiver and consent form.

(Record at

6).
7.

Mr. Gaskill at no time submitted his person or intended

to submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court for
purposes of considering or entering a money judgment against him.
(Record at 19, paragraph 7 ) .
8.

The introductory paragraph of the findings of fact and

conclusions of law in support of the divorce decree states that,
"plaintiff having filed an Appearance and Waiver authorizing the
entry of Default as per the provisions in the complaint; the same
was taken note of by the court and the default entered."

(Record

at 8) (emphasis added).
9.

Despite Mr. Gaskill's alteration of the consent and

waiver form to omit the paragraph requesting alimony, the court
5
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ignored the alteration and proceeded to enter a decree of
divorcef including alimony terms substantially similar to those
set forth in the complaint, which were excepted by Mr. Gaskill.
(Record at 11, paragraph 4 ) .
10.

Subsequent to Mr. Gaskill's alteration and return of

the consent and waiver, no notice was given to him that the court
would nevertheless hear, consider or decide the claim for
alimony, and, consequently, he did not have the opportunity to
appear and oppose the claim.
11.

(Record at 19, paragraphs 8 and 9 ) .

Mr. Gaskill was not notified of the entry of judgment

in the divorce action, and his obligation to pay alimony under
the terms of the divorce decree as rendered by the court.
(Record at 19).
12.

Approximately twenty-one months after entry of

judgment, on or about September 8, 1978, Mrs. Gaskill filed a
motion for order to show cause why Mr. Gaskill should not be held
in contempt for failure to pay alimony.
13.

(Record at 14-15).

Mrs. Gaskill claims that Mr. Gaskill knew of the

judgment before the 1978 order to show cause, alleging that she
repeatedly asked him to "provide financial assistance" to her and
to "pay the alimony as ordered by the court."

(Record at 59, 64,

paragraph 21)
14.

Mr. Gaskill claims that he first learned that the

decree of divorce included a judgment against him for alimony on
or about September 15, 1978, when he was served with an order to
show cause in the matter.

(Record at 16, 19-20).
6
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i

15.

Immediately upon being served with a motion for

contempt in 1978, Mr. Gaskill took steps to bring this matter to
the attention of the court by retaining counsel.

(Record at 19-

20)
16.

On October 31 f 1978, Mr. Gaskill responded and

contended that he wrote "omit #8 on Complaint" on the consent and
waiver.

He contended that the alimony provisions of the decree

should be set aside as provided by Rule 60(b)(7), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
jurisdiction.
17.

(Record at 19).

The matter was scheduled to be heard on 21 November,

1978, at 3:30 p.m.
18.

He also raised the issue of subject matter

(Record at 22, 24).

Mrs. Gaskill did not respond to Mr. Gaskill's

"Affidavit in Support of Motion to Amend Decree of Divorce."
19.

At the 21 November, 1978, hearing the court requested

the parties to submit memoranda.
20.

(Record at 24).

Approximately seven months later, July 2, 1979, the

court, by minute entry, stated "This matter having heretofore
been heard by this court and taken under advisement.

Court now

states neither party having filed the memorandum ordered by the
court, the petition is denied without prejudice."

(Record at

25).
21.

The record shows that Mrs. Gaskill took no steps to set

aside the court's dismissal of her action.

(Record in its

entirety).
22.

Mrs. Gaskill claims that after the dismissal of the
7
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1978 action she did try to collect alimony from Mr. Gaskill.
(Record at 45, paragraph 2, and 64-65, paragraphs 6 and 7 ) .
23.

Mrs. Gaskill admits that several years passed without

any communication between the parties.

(Record at 64, paragraph

8).
24.

Mrs. Gaskill admits that, when the parties have been

together at various time since the 1978 action, she has never
attempted to address the issue of alimony.

(Record at 65,

paragraph 11).
25.

Mr. Gaskill claims that subsequent to the dismissal of

the 1978 action Mrs. Gaskill never made mention of any intent to
collect alimony, and cites several occasions when the parties
have seen each other over the years, at which times she did not
mention alimony.
5,6,7
26.

(Record at 27, paragraph 5, 73-74, paragraphs

and 8 ) .
The record shows there has been no action in this case

for twelve (12) years.
27.

(Record in its entirety).

On August 19, 1991, more than 12 years after dismissal

of the action in 1978, Mrs Gaskill took the judgment to the State
of Washington, claiming delinquent alimony.
28.

(Record at 79).

Mrs. Gaskill knew that Mr. Gaskill was employed and

believed that he had the financial ability to pay alimony.
(Record at 63, paragraph 3)
29.

On December 10, 1991, Mr. Gaskill filed a verified

petition to modify decree, and a motion for order to show cause
why the court should not certify to the court in the State of
8
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Washington that certain issues were before the Utah court
concerning the validity of the decree, whether the decree should
be amended nunc pro tunc, and whether Mrs. Gaskill had waived any
right to alimony.
30.

(Record at 32).

Mrs. Gaskill responded by asking the court to dismiss

Mr. Gaskill's petition and moved for entry of judgment.

(Record

at 44-46, 47-52).
31.

The trial court granted judgment for Mrs. Gaskill in

the amount of $81,239.36.
32.

(Record at 114).

The record shows that Mrs. Gaskill has filed two

memoranda in this case, but has not cited one statute, case or
other authority in support of her position on the issues of
waiver, estoppel and nunc pro tunc amendment of the decree, nor
has she discussed these issues in light of the authorities cited
by Mr. Gaskill.

(Record at 47-52, 97-98).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Assuming without admitting that the decree contains a valid
judgment to pay alimony, Mrs. Gaskill has waived her claim for
alimony.

Her waiver is based upon more than silence.

She

initiated an action to enforce the judgment in 1978, but
thereafter did not respond to his affidavit in 1978, nor did she
respond to the court's request to furnish memoranda, nor did she
respond to the court's dismissal of her claim for failure to
prosecute.

Moreover, she did not thereafter, for "several

years," (Mrs. Gaskill's affidavit, Record at 64, paragraph 8 ) ,
initiate any affirmative claim, whether oral or written, for Mr.
9
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Gaskill to pay alimony, and has taken no further action to
enforce her right to alimony since she allowed her action to
enforce the judgment in 197 8 to be dismissed.
Mr. Gaskill has relied to his detriment on Mrs. Gaskill's
failure to act when she was under a duty or obligation to speak
or act in response (1) to his defense in the 1978 action, (2) to
the court's request for memorandum in the same case, or (3) to
the court's dismissal of her action for failure to prosecute.
Furthermore, he has relied on her subsequent failure to enforce
the judgment for over twelve years.

Therefore, Mrs. Gaskill

should be estopped to assert her right to alimony.
Moreover, the original decree including alimony provisions
was entered based on a consent and waiver which was altered on
its face to omit the consent to the terms of alimony set forth in
the complaint.

This circumstance created "good cause" to amend

the decree nunc pro tunc pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-l to
delete the alimony provision.

That there is good cause to amend

the decree, is bolstered by Mrs. Gaskillfs subsequent failure to
enforce the judgment for over twelve (12) years.
Finally, the district court entered a judgment for an amount
based on miscalculations resulting in a judgment substantially
larger than the historical and mathematical facts support.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE LAW TO THE
FACTS REGARDING MR. GASKILL'S CLAIMS THAT MRS. GASKILL
WAIVED HER RIGHT TO ALIMONY AND/OR THAT SHE SHOULD BE
ESTOPPED TO ASSERT THAT RIGHT.
10
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Because the undisputed facts support a finding of both
waiver and estoppel against Mrs. Gaskill on the issue of alimony,
the failure of the court to consider the elements of these
defenses raised by Mr. Gaskill in light of the facts is
reversible error.

Marshalling the evidence in support of each

party's position, the record shows the following:
The facts, assuming the decree provides for a valid award of
alimony, which show Mrs. Gaskill would be entitled to the
judgment for alimony are:
1.

There is a decree of divorce which provides for the

payment of alimony;

(Record at 11).

2.

No payments have ever been made.

3.

All other facts are disputed and are based upon Mrs.

Gaskill's affidavit which is vague and ambiguous.
The undisputed facts which weigh in favor of Mr. Gaskill's
position that Mrs. Gaskill waived her claim to alimony, and his
alternative position that she should be estopped to assert her
claim to alimony are as follows:
1.

The record does not show a response to Mr. Gaskill's

"Affidavit in Support of Motion to Amend Decree of Divorce,"
filed in the 1978 action brought by Mrs. Gaskill for alimony
arrearages.
2.

She did not act for seven months;

Mrs. Gaskill failed to prosecute her action to enforce

the judgment in 1978, even after being ordered by the court to

11
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submit a memorandum in support of her position;
3.

The record shows that Mrs. Gaskill did not seek any

relief from the order dismissing her claim in the 1978 action;
4.

The record shows that Mrs. Gaskill did not take further

legal action for more than twelve (12) years, from the July 2,
1979f dismissal to the August 19, 1991, action for delinquent
alimony in the State of Washington;
5.

For a period of "several years" the parties did not

1

Mr. Gaskill's failure to submit a memorandum and to
prosecute to completion his defense in the 1978 action does not
weigh in favor of the judgment for Mrs. Gaskillf because in the
face of her failure to prosecute her action once his defense was
raised, the most reasonable conclusion for Mr. Gaskill to draw
was that she had determined not to pursue her cause of action,
and had voluntarily waived any claim for alimony, based on her,
or her counsel's, analysis of the relative strengths of the two
positions. Mrs. Gaskill has not alleged that she abandoned the
action for financial reasons, which might have been attributed to
Mr. Gaskill's failure to pay alimony, and therefore might have
made insignificant or irrelevant the fact of her failure to
prosecute the action to completion.
Nor does there appear on the record any other undisputed
fact which might have led Mr. Gaskill to believe that she still
maintained her claim for alimony. The only disputed fact is in
paragraph 7 of her affidavit dated 8 February, 1992, which
provides she asked him approximately six times to pay alimony.
This bare statement does not state when, where, or who was
present, or any specific facts which give the statement
credibility. In fact, the next paragraph provides "several years
passed without communication." The requests for alimony which
Mrs. Gaskill alleges that she made subsequent to the dismissal of
the 1978 action, (record at 64), if actually made, would not
necessarily have lead Mr. Gaskill to believe that she had not
waived her claim, but could reasonably have been interpreted as
requests for help based on her own sense that he owed her
something despite her conclusion that she had no legal claim.
Finally, contrary to the conclusion of the commissioner,
(record at 90), in the face of an apparent waiver of her claim,
Mr. Gaskill may have perceived no practical incentive to incur
further costs to prosecute his defense to an action that he
believed had been waived, which belief was borne out by the
subsequent twelve years of inaction by Mrs. Gaskill.
12
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communicate at all;

(Mrs. Gaskill's affidavit dated 8 February,

1992, paragraph 8, Record at 64).
6.

During the several occasions on which the parties

associated at various gatherings, Mrs. Gaskill never once
mentioned alimony or an intent to collect it to Mr. Gaskill;
(Record at 27, paragraph 5, 73,74).
7.

Mrs. Gaskill knew that Mr. Gaskill was employed and

believed that had the financial ability to pay alimony.2
In addition to the foregoing undisputed facts, the evidence
as to whether Mrs. Gaskill even once mentioned the issue of
alimony or indicated any intent to seek to enforce it is
disputed.

With respect to seeking alimony payments from Mr.

Gaskill, Mrs. Gaskill's affidavit states:
a.

That between the divorce in 1976 and the enforcement

action in 1978, she "repeatedly asked Defendant to provide
financial assistance to [herself] and pay the alimony as ordered
by the Court," (record at 64);
b.

That "Defendant remarried in 1977 or 1978 and told me

that his new wife would not allow him to pay alimony to me,"
(record at 64);
c.

That "After Defendant divorced his second wife, he

contacted me approximately six times, and I again asked him to
pay alimony to me and he refused," (record at 64);
d.

That Mr. Gaskill "told our children over the years that

2

Thus, her failure to claim alimony was not based on a
belief that Mr. Gaskill was unable to pay.
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he was afraid to visit them in Utah because I would have him
'thrown in jail' because he had not paid me any alimony," (record
at 64) .
Mrs. Gaskill's Affidavit is controverted by Mr. Gaskill's
Affidavits in which he asserts that he has been informed of Mrs.
Gaskill's claim for alimony only once, when he was served with
the documents asserting her claim for $6,000 in alimony in 197 8.
(Record at 27, 73). Moreover, Mrs. Gaskill's Affidavit is vague,
ambiguous, lacks specificity, lacks foundation, is based in part
on hearsay, and admits that for a period of "several years" she
did not make demand upon Mr. Gaskill for alimony, and that they
have associated several times over the years without any
indication on her part, during such associations, that she
intended to claim alimony.

Although she claims that they did not

discuss alimony because the children were present, she never
claims to have asked for a private talk.

(Record at 64, 65,

paragraphs 10 and 11).
A.
Waiver Is A Legal Doctrine Which Can Be Based On Conduct Of
The Party Against Whom It Is Asserted Which Is Inconsistent
With Any Other Intent Than To Waive The Right.
Waiver is a legal doctrine.3

This court has set out a three

part test for waiver to occur: "'[1] there must be an existing
right, benefit or advantage, [2] a knowledge of its existence,

Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430, 432 (Utah 1983).
14
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and [3] an intention to relinquish it.'" 4

The elements of waiver

do not include justifiable reliance or detrimental change of
position by the party asserting the defense of waiver.5

Rather,

the inquiry is focused on the party against whom the waiver is
being asserted: did she have an existing right; did she know she
had the right; did she intend to relinquish the right?
In analyzing whether the person has exhibited an intention
to relinquish the right, this court has said "'The party's
actions or conduct must evince unequivocally an intent to waive,
or must be inconsistent with any other intent.'

'Whether a right

has been waived is generally a question of fact and therefore we
accord considerable deference to the finder of fact's
determination.'"6
In the present case, the trial court made no determination
as to the facts which would support a conclusion of waiver;
therefore, no deference is necessary in evaluating the facts here
because the facts which support a finding of waiver are
undisputed as will be shown.

Because all evidence was presented

by affidavits, the court is in as good a position to view it and
to apply it as was the trial court.

4

Hinkley v. Hinkley, 815 P.2d 1352 (Utah App. 1991)
(quoting Mont Trucking v. Entrada Indus., 802 P.2d 779, 781 (Utah
App. 1990) (quoting Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah
App. 1988)).
5

As will be shown infra, however, justifiable reliance and
detrimental change of position are elements of estoppel. See
e.g., Hinkley, 669 P.2d at 432.
6

Id.
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Mrs. Gaskill has notf by spoken or written word, expressed
unequivocally an intent to waive her right to alimony.
Thereforef her conduct must be evaluated to determine whether it
is inconsistent with any other intent.
B.
Mrs. Gaskill's Conduct Is Inconsistent With Any Other Intent
Than To Waive Her Right To Alimony.
The case of Hinklev v. Hinklev, 815 P. 2d 1352 (Utah App.
1991) is helpful.

The parties were divorced in 1980.

The decree

ordered Mr. Hinkley to pay alimony in the amount of $1,200 a
month, reduced by one-half of Mrs. Hinkley's net income.

In 1989

Mr. Hinkley filed a petition to reduce or terminate alimony.

The

trial court ruled that he waived his right to reduce his past
alimony payment by one-half of her income for the years 1981
through 1989.

In affirming the trial court's ruling that he had

waived his right to reduce past alimony the appellate court said:
In order to find waiver in
shown that Mr. Hinkley had
he was awarded such right,
relinquished that right."

the present case, it must be
a right to the reduction, that
and that he intentionally
Id. at 1354-55.

In the Gaskill case, assuming the decree to contain a valid
provision for alimony, Mrs. Gaskill had a right to receive
alimony.

She obviously knew of that right because she went to

court to enforce it in 197 8.
defenses in 197 8.

She was told to brief Mr. Gaskill's

She failed to act.

the dismissal of her claim.

She did not follow up on

She claims, and this claim is

disputed, that she asked him six times to pay alimony.

(Record

64 paragraph 7 ) . Most significantly, she also provides in the
16
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next paragraph "several years passed without any communication
between us."

(Record 64 paragraph 8 ) .

It is known and undisputed that Mrs. Gaskill knew of Mr.
Gaskill's defenses in 1978.
1979.

She knew the action was dismissed in

It is undisputed she took no action from 1979 to 1991.

Her failure to act after being confronted with his defenses for
twelve years after her claim was dismissed in 1979 is
"inconsistent with any other intent" other than to waive her
claim for alimony.
"The question whether waiver will be found in any particular
case depends not upon the secret intention of the party
against whom it is asserted, but upon the effect which her
conduct had upon the other party."7

"Stated another way, one

cannot prevent a waiver by a private mental reservation contrary
to an intent to waive, where his or her actions clearly indicate
such an intent."8
On the other hand, it has also been recognized that, "Mere
silence is not a waiver unless there is some duty or obligation
to speak."9

Shedding further light on this principle, the Utah

Supreme Court recently affirmed a jury instruction including the
following provisions with regard to silence as a basis for
7

B.R. Woodward Mktq. v. Collins Food, 754 P.2d 99 (Utah
App. 1988).
8

Id.

9

Plateau Min. v. Utah Div. of State Lands, 802 P.2d 720,
730 (Utah 1990) ("The State's acceptance of royalty payments in
amounts less than the amount owed does not mean that the State
waived its right to full payment." Id.).
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finding a waiver:
A waiver may be shown from a totality of the
circumstances surrounding the alleged waiver.
* * *

A waiver may be proved by indirect evidence. Silence,
or failure to act under some circumstances may be sufficient
to prove waiver where such silence or failure to act is
unequivocal and inconsistent with any other intent.
A waiver may be inferred from a party's acknowledgement
of his rights and his subsequent course of conduct. You may
look at the totality of the circumstancesf including the
background experience and conduct of the party to determine
if he made a voluntary waiver of a right. 0
Based upon the facts, Mrs. Gaskill cannot reasonably assert
that the defense of waiver is based on "mere" silence.

She once

asserted her claim for alimony in an adversarial proceeding, and
then, having failed to submit a memorandum supporting her
position, abandoned her claim, allowed it to be dismissed, failed
to seek relief from the dismissal, and failed to seek enforcement
of the judgment for over twelve years.

Contrary to the

implication of the court that the question is a matter of who had
the greater "incentive" to prosecute the action, the question is
whether Mrs. Gaskill had "duty or obligation to speak," Plateau
Min. v. Utah Div. of State Lands, 802 P.2d 720 at 730 (Utah
1990).
Generally, there is no duty or obligation to seek
enforcement of a judgment.

However, once Mrs. Gaskill brought an

action to enforce the judgment, and was confronted with defenses
she left her safe harbor.

Her failure to supply the requested

memorandum, or further prosecute the action, or seek relief from
10

Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069,
1074 (Utah 1991).
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the dismissal is clearly a failure to act in circumstances in
which she had a "duty or obligation to speak or act." 11
Considering the "totality of the circumstances surrounding the
alleged waiver," 12

Mrs. Gaskill's conduct is inconsistent with

any other intent than to waive her right to alimony.
In Hinkley, the court of appeals also affirmed the trial
court's conclusion that the defendant had voluntarily waived his
right to reduce his alimony payments for the entire nine year
period between the divorce decree and the trial court's ruling,
including those payments he had refused to make during the five
months after attempting to assert his right to reduce his alimony
payments by filing the petition. Id. at 1353.

This conclusion

demonstrates what has been expressly recognized in other
jurisdictions, namely that once a right is waived, it cannot be
asserted in a court of law thereafter.13

11

See e.g., Avila v. Winn, 794 P.2d 20, 22 (Utah 1990)(the
court stated, "Inasmuch as defendants brought the initial motion
to dismiss, it was incumbent upon them to seek and obtain a final
ruling on their motion from [the court]."
12

Rees, 808 P2d at 1074.

13

E.g., Vogel v. Carolina Int'l., Inc., 711 P.2d 708, 711
(Colo. App. 1985) ("A waiver is a voluntary abandonment of a
known right, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered
and such persons be forever deprived of its benefit. [Citations
omitted]."); Iola State Bank v. Biggs, 662 P.2d 563, 571-72
(Kan. 1983) ("Once it has been established that a contractual
right has been waived, a party possessing the contractual right
is precluded from asserting it in a court of law. [Citations
omitted].")
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c.
Estoppel Is An Equitable Doctrine Which May Be Based On A
Person's Failure To Act When She Had A Duty Or Obligation To
Act.
Estoppel is an equitable doctrine.14

The Utah Supreme Court

has defined the elements of estoppel as follows:

"(i) [A]

statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party
inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (ii) reasonable action
or inaction by the other party taken or not taken on the basis of
the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act;
and (iii) injury to the second party that would result from
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such
statement, admission, act, or failure to act.
omitted.]"

[Footnote

Avila v. Winn, 794 P.2d 20, 22 (Utah 1990).

The focus of an equitable estoppel inquiry is on the party
asserting it.

Thus, it must be determined whether the person

claiming an estoppel justifiably or reasonably relied on the act
or failure to act of the other person.

The question is not

merely whether he subjectively relied on the act or failure to
act, but whether his reliance was objectively reasonable.15
Then, one must show "injury to the second party that would result
from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such
statement, admission, act, or failure to act," or, in other
words, a detrimental change of position.
In Avila v. Winn, 794 P.2d 20 (Utah 1990), the plaintiff in
a medical malpractice action filed a premature complaint, before

14

See e.g., Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430, 432 (Utah

1983).
15

Larson v. Wycoff Co., 624 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Utah 1981).
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the prelitigation panel review was complete.

Id. at 21.

The

defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on the
irregularity of the premature complaint.

Id.

The court did not

dismiss the complaint, but instead tolled the proceedings until a
prelitigation review could be completed. Id.

The defendants

failed to obtain a final ruling on their motion to dismiss.
at 22.

Id.

The plaintiff did not file a second complaint within the

sixty day period following completion of the panel's reviewf in
which he was statutorily required to file his complaint, because
his initial, premature complaint had not been dismissed.

Id.

The defendants' again moved to dismiss for failure to file within
the statutory period.

Id.

The Utah Supreme Court reversed the

trial court's dismissal, and held that, "Inasmuch as defendants
brought the initial motion to dismiss, it was incumbent upon them
to seek and obtain a final ruling on their motion from the court.
Having failed to do so, defendants should now be estopped from
asserting Mr. Avila's failure to file a second complaint."
at 22.

Id.

The court found that the plaintiff's reliance, on the

failure of the defendants to act to obtain a final ruling on
their motion, was reasonable.
D.
Mrs. Gaskill's Failure To Act Is Sufficient To Support Mr.
Gaskill's Assertion Of The Defense Of Estoppel.
In the present case, Mrs. Gaskill likewise failed to
prosecute her 1978 petition, and Mr. Gaskill relied to his
detriment on her abandonment of her claim case by failing to
pursue his defenses and by continuing his consistent conduct of
21
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not making alimony payments.

He was entitled to believe that the

alimony provision of the divorce decree was improperly entered
contrary to the consent and waiverf as he had asserted in his
defense.

He was entitled to rely on her inaction.

Specifically, Mrs. Gaskill failed to respond to Mr.
Gaskill f s

affidavit in support of motion to amend decree of

divorce, failed to file a memorandum as requested by the court,
failed to seek relief from the dismissalf failed to communicate
at all with Mr. Gaskill for several yearsf failed to discuss
alimony with him or even attempt to speak to him alone on any of
the several occasions at which they associated over the past
twelve years, and failed to bring an action to enforce the
judgment for over twelve years after the first action which was
dismissed.
In Burrow v. Vrontikis, 788 P.2d 1046 (Utah App. 1990), this
court statedf "it is uncontroverted that appellant failed to make
any request or to take any action to require respondent to pay
back child support for seven years.
delay."

Id. at 1048.

This was an unreasonable

This delay and Burrow's statement that she

did not "wish to see him again f " Id. at 1047, was sufficient for
an estoppel.
By her own admission, Mrs. Gaskill made no communication
with Mr. Gaskill for "several years", failed to mention alimony
on any of the occasions when they did associate, and after the
1978 action was dismissed, failed to bring any kind of action to
enforce the judgment for over twelve years, almost twice the time
22
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found to be unreasonable in Burrow,
when she had a duty to act.

Moreover, she failed to act

She had a duty to act because it was

incumbent upon her to seek and obtain a final resolution of her
claim for unpaid alimony.

See Avila, 794 P.2d 20 at page 22.

It is clear that Mrs. Gaskill's failure to act was
reasonably relied on to his detriment by Mr. Gaskill for over
twelve years.

Therefore, Mrs. Gaskill should be estopped to

assert her right to alimony under the provisions of the decree of
divorce.

Failure to so find was reversible error.
POINT II.

THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT IT WOULD BE INEQUITABLE FOR
MR. GASKILL TO ASSERT THE DEFENSES OF WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL.
In addressing the issues of waiver and estoppel raised by
each party, the commissioner wrote and the trial court adopted
the following statement:
Both parties claim the other should be estopped from
asserting his or her position as a result of failure to
resolve the actions initiated in October, 1978 and failure
to pursue said positions at any point subsequent to 1978,
and both parties assert that same circumstance result [sic]
in the other's waiving any claim for relief. In not
pursuing her claim for relief, plaintiff ran the risk that
her recovery would be limited, as it has been, by operation
of the applicable statute of limitations. Conversely,
defendant's awareness of a prima facie valid order of the
Court requiring his payment of alimony and his failure to
prosecute his Motion to Amend said Decree created the risk
that the order would be enforced against the defendant. Of
the two, defendant had at least equal incentive to prosecute
to completion the relief he sought in his 1978 pleading.
Under the present circumstances, it would be inequitable to
find that either party is estopped from asserting their
respective positions or that they have waived the same.
(Record at 90, 102). The trial court implies by this statement
that Mrs. Gaskill's failure to prosecute the 1978 action to
23
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

completion or to bring another action in the subsequent twelve
years only subjects her claim to the defense of the statute of
limitations.

Apparently because Mr. Gaskill failed in 197 8 to

prosecute his defense to completion, the court concluded that Mr.
Gaskill is therefore not entitled to assert the defense of
waiver.

However, there is no basis for this conclusion.

The

court cites no facts which would support an equitable bar to Mr.
Gaskill's defenses of waiver and estoppel, but simply concludes
that it would be inequitable to allow the defenses.
A.
There Are No Facts Which Support The Equitable Bar Of
Estoppel Against Mr. Gaskill's Assertion Of The Defenses Of
Waiver And Estoppel.
Not only does the court fail to state a basis for concluding
that equity precludes the assertion of the defenses of waiver and
estoppel, there are no facts on the record which support such a
conclusion.

*

There is no showing that Mrs. Gaskill has relied to her
detriment on any act, or representation by Mr. Gaskill which
would give rise to an equitable estoppel against either defense.
Mr. Gaskill has never admitted that he owed alimony under the
decree, but has maintained throughout that the order was
improperly entered.

It is significant that he never paid her,

nor has Mr. Gaskill ever represented that he would not assert the
defenses of waiver and estoppel.

Although to one trained in the

lawf it may seem illogical for Mr. Gaskill to have failed to
fully prosecute a defense which may well have prevailed in the
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1978 proceeding, to a layman it makes little sense to invest
further monies in defense of an action which for all intents and
purposes has been abandoned, presumably in recognition of the
strength of his proffered defense,

Mr. Gaskill's failure to

prosecute his defense in these circumstances cannot be considered
grounds for reasonable reliance on a conclusion that he had
abandoned the defense, or that he had waived that defense or any
other defenses in the matter.

There are no facts on which to

base a conclusion that Mr. Gaskill should be equitably estopped
from asserting the defenses of waiver and estoppel.
B.
There Are No Facts Which Support The Equitable Bar Of Laches
Against Mr. Gaskill's Assertion Of The Defenses Of Waiver
And Estoppel.
If the court had in mind the bar of laches, it likewise
failed to point to any facts which would support such a
conclusion, and there are no such facts in the record.

Laches is

applicable when a delay due to lack of diligence by one party
causes a disadvantage to the other party.16

Any lack of

diligence on the part of Mr. Gaskill in pursuing his defense in
1978 was prompted by the lack of diligence of Mrs. Gaskill in
prosecuting her complaint against him, and cannot reasonably be
construed as causing an injury or disadvantage to her.
Specifically, it would not be reasonable to assume that he had
conceded her position because he did not fully prosecute his

16

Plateau Min. v. Utah Div. of State Lands, 802 P.2d 720,
731 (Utah 1990).
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defense in 1978.

Mrs. Gaskill has not changed her position due

to Mr. Gaskill's failure to seek relief from the judgment.

When

he raised his defenses in 1978, she failed to prosecute the
action further, and despite his subsequent failure to prosecute
his defenses in that action, Mrs. Gaskill has not changed her
position from her initial abandonment of the claim for over
twelve years.

Mr. Gaskill's defenses of waiver and estoppel do

not change the status quo which Mrs. Gaskill has allowed to exist
not only for the previous twelve years, but also for the two
years prior to the 1978 action.
The court, in the above-quoted paragraph, also concluded
that, "Of the two, defendant [Mr. Gaskill] had at least equal
incentive to prosecute to completion the relief he sought in his
1978 pleading."

While the accuracy of this conclusion is

questionable, it is irrelevant in either case.

Mr. Gaskill may

or may not have had incentive to prosecute his defense to
completion in 1978, but that fact has nothing to do with whether
Mrs. Gaskill had a right, knew of that right, and intentionally
relinquished it, or whether Mr. Gaskill reasonably relied to his
detriment on the conduct and failure to act of Mrs. Gaskill.

If

the facts show that Mr. Gaskill is entitled to the defenses of
waiver and estoppel today, the fact that he failed to prosecute
his Rule 60(b)(7) defense to completion in 1978, taken in light
of all of the circumstances, is not sufficient to support an
equitable bar to his assertion of waiver and estoppel.
Therefore, the court's conclusion that it would be inequitable to
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allow Mr. Gaskill to assert his defenses of waiver and estoppel,
is error.
POINT III.
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF AN ORDER MODIFYING THE DECREE
NUNC PRO TUNC IS REVERSIBLE ERROR.
The district court affirmed the commissioner's
recommendation, which states:
"Defendant seeks, in the alternative, an order modifying the
Decree of Divorce terminating defendant's obligation to pay
alimony to plaintiff. In this regard defendant has failed
to allege, and the Court cannot find, a substantial change
of circumstances has occurred material to the issue of
alimony. Consequently the Court recommends the Decree of
Divorce not be modified."17
A.
The Court Applied the Wrong Law in Ruling on the Motion for
an Order Modifying the Original Decree Nunc Pro Tunc.
The test applied by the trial court, and affirmed by the
district court, in ruling on Mr. Gaskill's motion to amend the
decree nunc pro tunc is the test set forth in Hinkley v. Hinkley,
815 P.2d 1352 (Utah App. 1991), wherein it is stated, "'To obtain
a modification of a divorce decree, the movant must show a
substantial change of circumstances subsequent to the decree,
that was not contemplated within the decree itself.'
omitted]."

[Citations

Id. at 1354 (emphasis in original).

Mr. Gaskill did not, however, seek a subsequent modification
to the divorce decree.

(Record 32, 34, 36). Rather, he is

seeking to amend the original decree nunc pro tunc.

The rule of

law to be applied in determining whether to grant a nunc pro tunc
17

Record at 92.
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amendment of a divorce decree is set out by statute in Utah Code
Ann. § 30-4a-l (1990), and differs substantially from the rule
applied by the district court.

Section 30-4a-l provides, "A

court having jurisdiction may, upon its finding of good cause and
giving of such notice as may be ordered, enter an order nunc pro
tunc in a matter relating to marriage, divorce, legal separation
or annulment of marriage."
At common law the nunc pro tunc power of the court was used
for two general purposes, the one being to correct a clerical or
ministerial error of the court, the other being to remedy a
situation in which a party died between the time the case was
submitted and the time judgment was to be rendered in the case.
Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298, 299 (Utah 1984).

The use of the

common law nunc pro tunc power to correct a clerical error is
only permitted to make the record reflect what actually happened;
it is not used to retrospectively enter an order based on
hindsight as to what the court ought to have done.

Id.

Such was the state of the law regarding nunc pro tunc orders
in Utah until the above referenced statute, Utah Code Ann. § 304a-1, was enacted which modifies the common law doctrine by
"committing broad discretion to trial courts in granting nunc pro
tunc orders in domestic matters," H o m e v. H o m e , 737 P.2d 244,
247 (Utah App. 1987) (emphasis in original).

In H o m e the court

stated that, "A literal reading of § 30-4a-l indicates a
legislative intent to change the standard for entry of nunc pro
tunc orders in domestic proceedings from requiring a previously
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made final order as delineated by common law, to requiring a
finding of "good cause."

Id. at 248 (emphasis in original).

Thus, because this case deals with matters relating to
divorce, it falls within the scope of § 30-4a-l.

Mr. Gaskill is

entitled to an order modifying the decree nunc pro tunc if two
conditions are met, namely a finding of good cause and the giving
of such notice as may be ordered.
B.
Mr. Gaskill Is Entitled To An Order Modifying The Decree Of
Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc Because The Undisputed Facts Establish
Good Cause For Such An Order.
In defining "good cause,"

the court in H o m e stated that,

"it must be borne in mind that the legislative history indicates
an intention to give the courts wide discretion to prevent
'obvious injustices.'

The meaning of 'good cause' must be

determined on a case by case basis, in light of all of the
surrounding circumstances, as equity and justice require.
[Citations omitted]." 18

"The Utah Supreme Court has frequently

stated that in construing legislative enactments, courts must
give effect to the legislature's underlying intent." 19
In Baqshaw v. Baqshaw, 788 P.2d 1057 (Utah App. 1990), this
court stated that certain of the common law principles concerning
nunc pro tunc "are relevant, if not controlling, in a
determination of good cause under Section 30-4a-l."

Id. at 1061.

Relevant to the present case, the court in Baqshaw pointed out
18

IcL_ at 248-49.

19

IdU. at 247.
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that at common law, "nunc pro tunc allowed a court to correct its
earlier error or supply its. amission so the record accurately
reflected that which in fact had taken place,"

Id, at 1060.

The

provision providing alimony in the original decree was the
court's error.

Mr. Gaskill did not consent to it.

Mr. Gaskill

should not be penalized for failure to pursue relief from the
error of the court.
In light of the foregoing principles, good cause exists for
allowing an order nunc pro tunc to omit the alimony provisions
from the decree.

The facts which clearly so indicate are as

clear to this court as to the district court.

First, the consent

and waiver does not state that Mr. Gaskill has, or knows that he
should have, consulted with legal counsel before signing the
waiver and consent form.

There is no evidence of any attempt to

advise defendant to seek legal counsel before or after he signed
the consent and waiver.

Second, Mr. Gaskill altered the consent

and waiver to omit consent to entry of a default judgment on the
terms in the complaint.

Mr. Gaskill's attempt to consent to

waiver of personal service while objecting to entry of a default
judgment for alimony by writing "omit #8 on complaint" on the
waiver was probably done without the direction of counsel,
because it is unlikely that an attorney familiar with the rules
of procedure would proceed in such a manner.

Third, the obvious

lack of legal counsel and the obvious attempt to object to entry
of a default judgment for alimony, clear in substance though
improper in form, ought to have raised a red flag for the court
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and for plaintiff that there was not an agreement to the terms
for alimony set forth in the complaint.

Furthermore, such a

procedural mistake by defendant was potentially grounds for
subsequent relief from the judgment pursuant to Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b). 2 0
In Locke v. Peterson, 285 P.2d 1111, 1113, (Utah 1955), when
the copy of the summons left with the defendant differed from the
copy of the summons filed with the court, and was defective and
could not have conferred jurisdiction on the court itself, the
court stated:
Thus we have filed a proper summons, receipt of which is
accepted which conferred jurisdiction of the defendant on
the court. However if a true copy of the summons which was
left with the defendant had been filed it would have been
defective and would not have conferred jurisdiction. This
situation created sufficient confusion that the motion to
set aside the default and judgment against the defendant
should have been granted and he should have been allowed to
plead consistent with our declared policy that in case of
uncertainty, default judgments should be set aside to allow
trial on the merits. [Emphasis added.]
The fact in Locke on which the court based its conclusion that
the service of process created "sufficient uncertainty" that the

20

In Nev v. Harrison, 299 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1956), the court
held that there were sufficient grounds for the trial court, in
its discretion, to grant relief from the judgment pursuant to
Rule 60(b)(7), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, where the
defaulting defendant had mistakenly believed she was fully
protected in the matter by a divorce decree ordering her husband
to pay any real estate commissions arising from the sale of
apartments, which commissions were the subject of the suit. The
court distinguished the case from Weinberger v. Manning, 123 P.2d
531 (Cal. App. 1942), in which the defaulted party had "refused
to hire counsel although she had been [repeatedly] advised to do
so and had general experience with lawyers," and her "entire
conduct showed contemptuous disregard of legal process." Ney,
299 P.2d at 1116-17, n.5.
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defendant's motion to set aside should have been granted is
simply that the copy of the summons left with the defendant did
not advise him whether a complaint had already been filed or
whether one would be filed within ten days.
The question of the effect Mr. Gaskill's alteration of the
consent and waiver may be a question of first impression.

As

evidenced by the course of proceedings in this case, however, the
alteration by Mr. Gaskill did in fact create sufficient
uncertainty to entitle him to relief pursuant to a timely Rule
60(b)(7) motion under present case law.
But, more than thatf it must be recognized that Mr.
Gaskill's notation on the "consent and waiver" form to "omit #8
on Complaint" is no more an unconditional manifestation of
consent and waiver of personal service and opportunity to be
heard on the issue of alimony than a counter-offer is an
unconditional manifestation of acceptance in the formulation of a
contract.

At bestf the consent and waiver was sufficient

publication to confer jurisdiction on the court to enter a decree
of divorce without alimony, pursuant to Section 30-3-1, Utah Code
Annotated 1953 as amended.
If the court intended to proceed on the issue of alimony,
then it was incumbent upon the trial court to require that an
opportunity to be heard be given Mr. Gaskill.

Otherwise, the

court should have ordered the alimony terms stricken because that
term was omitted on the consent.

In any case, the court was or

should have been on notice that there was an irregularity in the
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acceptance of service and that the defendant was not a consenting
party to an uncontested award of alimony.
If however, the consent was fatally defective, then arguably
the court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant,
and the judgment does not bind him.

This is an undesirable and

unnecessary result because of subsequent marriages.
If the better reasoning is followed, that the consent and
waiver was sufficient "publication" to confer jurisdiction on the
court to enter a decree of divorce without terms of alimony, then
the conclusion must be that, since the court did not provide or
require notice and opportunity to be heard on the issue of
alimony, those provisions were improperly entered and there is
good cause to have them deleted a nunc pro tunc.

The advantage

of this alternative is that the divorce decree can, in large
measure, be left as it is.

The alimony provisions of the decree,

however, having been entered by default in the face of an
apparent objection on the record, clear in substance if not
proper in form, and without further notice to the defendant, or
opportunity to be heard, should not stand.

The decree should be

amended nunc pro tunc to delete the alimony provisions.

Failure

to enter said order was reversible error.
POINT IV.
IF MRS. GASKILL IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT, THE TRIAL COURT
SHOULD BE REVERSED AND THE MATTER REMANDED FOR A
DETERMINATION OF THE APPROPRIATE AMOUNT.
The court entered a judgment in the amount of $81,239.36.
The statute of limitations limxts the recovery of Mrs. Gaskill to
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the eight years.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-22.

96 months of delinquent alimony.
is $450.00 per month.

The judgment is for

The amount of the alimony award

Interest on the amounts due is calculated

at 10%, based upon Section 15-1-1 of the Utah Code.

If judgment

should be entered, it should be computed as $450 a month with
interest at 10% when each payment is due.

That amount is

$60,660. (See Appendix B ) .
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, appellant Don R. Gaskill,
respectfully requests this court to reverse the district court
and direct that court to enter an order that Mrs. Gaskill has
waived her right to alimony or that she is estopped to assert
that right.

In the alternative, Mr. Gaskill requests this court

to reverse the district court and direct that court to enter an
order amending the decree nunc pro tunc to omit the provision for
alimony.

Finally, if this court determines that Mrs. Gaskill is

entitled to a judgment for alimony, Mr. Gaskill requests this
court to vacate the judgment as to the amount of the judgment and
order the district court to enter an award for the proper amount.
Dated this ^L

day of January, 1993.

BRENT D. YOUNi
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this [& day of January, 1993, I
caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant Don R. Gaskill, to Helen E. Christian,
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee, postage prepaid, addressed as
follows:
Helen E. Christian
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN
Suite 722 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah
84
BRENT D. YOUNG
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ALBERTA FANNIE GASKILL aka LEE
oC

<m!fNTW

-

APPELLEE

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
DISTRICT COURT NO. 764923691
COURT OF APPEALS NO. 920632-CA

VS.
DON R. GASKILL
DEFENDANT -

APPELLANT

I, clerk of the above entitled court, do hereby certify that
the hereto attached file contains all the original papers as
requested by the designation on file herein, filed in the court in
the above entitled case, including the Notice of Appeal which was
filed on the

25th

day of

September

1992.

I further certify

that tne above described documents constitute the Judgment Roll and
that the same is a true and correct transcript of the record as it
appears in my office.
I further certify that said Judgment Roll is this date
transmitted to the Appellate Court of the State of Utah, pursuant
to such appeal.
Witness my hand and the seal of said court at Salt Lake City,
Utah, this 23

day of October

19 92.
A.

CRAIG E. LUDWIG
CLERK OF THE COURT/ \

BY
^
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN & FOR SALT LAKE COUNT
STATE OF UTAH

ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL
a/k/a LEE AND LEA GASKILL
,

Plaintiff,
vs.

COMPLAIN T

DON R. GASKILL,

C i v i l No, D

23691

Defendant.

COMES NOW the plaintiff and for cause of action alleges
as follows:
1.

Plaintiff and defendant were married on the 6th day

of May, 1951 in Golden, Colorado and have as issue of the
marriage four children, all of whom have reached their majority
by age or by marriage.
2.

That the plaintiff and defendant are residents of

Salt Lake County and have been residents of the State of Utah
for in excess of eight years prior to the date hereof.
3.
or shar

That plaintiff and defendant are no longer compatible!

mutual love or affection.
4.

That the defendant has absented himself from the

family home for a period in excess of eight months.
5. That the defendant is gainfully employed, earning
approximately $1,500 per month as a construction supervisor and
the plaintiff is

presently engaged in the School of Cosmotology

in which she anticipates graduating in approximately 30 months.
6.

That the plaintiff and defendant have made a

physical division of all property belonging to each other with
the defendant receiving as his sole and exclusive property his

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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nnnnno

I

-2personal effects and a truck, with the plaintiff retaining the
family furniture, a 1971 Toranado automobile.
7.

That the plaintiff and defendant are in the process

of resolving debts and claims arising out of the construction,
fire, sheriff's sale and subsequent sale of redemption on
property located in North Layton, and upon the payment of outstanding bills arising therefrom plaintiff, by agreement of
plaintiff and defendant, is to retain the proceeds as her sole
and exclusive property,
8. That the defendant pay the plaintiff $700.00 per
month alimony for a period of 30 months, after which time the
defendant has agreed to pay the plaintiff $450.00 per month
for the remainder of her life, providing, however, that should
the plaintiff re-marry all alimony payments shall cease forthwith,
9.

That the plaintiff desires to retain her married

name of Lea Alberta F. Gaskill.
10.

That the plaintiff and defendant have agreed that

attorney's fees shall be a claim and satisfied with the
outstanding debts arising out of the family interest in the
real property

as set forth above and to be paid at the time

that the funds are received in conjunction therewith.
11.

That the plaintiff and defendant have'been physic-

ally separated for a period in excess of eight months and prior
to that time for an additional period of six months prior to
a temporary reconciliation during which time both parties have
made plans which would greatly be facilitated by a waiver of
interlocutory periods as required by the statute.
WHEREFORE the plaintiff prays judgment in the dissolution
of the marriage, retention of her married name, the ratification
of the division and disposition of property as per the agreement hereinbefore set forth, and by attorney's fees to be levied
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000003

-3as claimed against the family asset flowing from the proceeds
of the home.

DATED this J^J day of S/+J&-

1976.

LEE A. GASKILL

STATE OF UTAH

)
)
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, LEE A. GASKILL, the plaintiff named in the foregoing
Complaint, do hereby make solemn oath that the statements
contained therein are true to the best of my knowledge,
information and belief.

.

J

LEE A. GASKILLN

^

L

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me thisJ^T day of

' W • • • , 1976.
Notary Public
Residing a t j ,
^
My commission empire's:" &/7X

7 RUNYAN
\7*
'Attorney for Plaintiff

0000C4
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JOHN E. RUNYAN
Attorney for Plaintiff
4625 South 2300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: 278-0431
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL
a/k/a LEE or LEA GASKILL,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DON R. GASKILL,
Defendant.

MOTION
FOR
WAIVER OF THE INTERLOCUTORY
PERIOD

Civil No.

PJ3&1/

COME NOW the plaintiff and defendant and by their
signatures attached hereto hereby petition the court for a
waiver of the interlocutory periods both prior to and following
the entry of the Decree inasmuch as the parties hereto have
made extensive attempts for reconciliation which have failed,
have been separated in excess of eight months during which
time both parties have made commitments and plans requiring
the parties absence from the state, which plans will be greatly
facilitated by the waiver petitioned for herein.

DATED this /^./ day ot^L^^j/

, 1976.
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SPP/5 "8IIJW7G
JOHN E. RUNYAN
Attorney for Plaintiff
4625 South 2300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: 2 78=0 4 31

CPUTr CLEAK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ALBERTA FAT ^Y GASKILL
a/k/a LEE < LEA GASKILL,
Plaintiff,
CONSENT AND WAIVER

vs.

civil NO.

DON R. GASKILL,

y-f3t>f/

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
)
)

ss.

DON R. GASKILL, being first duly sworn, deposes and
says:

That he is the defendant in the above-entitled action;

that he acknowledges the receipt of a copy of the Complaint
in the foregoing action, enters his appearance and consent
herein, waives service of Summons upon him, waives time
within which to answer or otherwise plead this said Complaint
and consents that his default may be entered and that the
Court may proceed to hear and determine said cause at any
time and without notice to said d^JtejfctJSFit.
DON R.
SUBSCRIBED ,-JtfD SWORN to before me this

c/ C

day of

, 197.;.

12S

)TARY PUBLIC
Residing a t ^ / C C # + K < J

My commission e x p i r e s :

MMM^WWM^ * * "

***m

foj

JP-/-79

OFFICIAL SEAL

?'•-, BARBARA J . HULSE
NOTARY PUBLIC • CALIFORNIA
PRINCIPAL OFFICE IN
LOS ANGELLS COUNTY

My Commission Expires August 1, 1979
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V.

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE - STATE OF UTAH
ALBERTA FANNEY G A S K I L L , a k a .

MINUTE ORDER

Plaintiff

LEE and LEA GASKILL

cas»«

P-23691

DON R. GASKILL

Div_

Type of hearing:

P At»y
P

JOHN

-OSC

. Annul-

XXX .Deft.

Pltf_

Present:

XXX

Summons

RUNY AN

E.

-Other-

\A/aiui»r

Afty

Default:
Date:

Sworn & Examined:

Pltf

XXX

-Deft

.Stipulation.

A A A

.Publication.

Pltf-

XXX

if;
S. SAWAYA

DECEMBER *, . T37F
w,

Judge:.

JAMES

r.»afw.
q»pn,f,.
Bailiff:

RUSSELL TANNER
J E A N I E WRIGHT
POINT G I L E S

ORDERS:
Counseling ordered
Custody study ordered.
Custody awarded to

. Reasonable, or:.

Visitation rights

Support

$

X.

.per month

Payments to be made thru the clerks office
each month, or Ya by the
Atty fees to the
Home to Pltf
Furnishings to Pltf

Alimony

Payments to be made by the

and % by the-

Deft

Auto to Pltf

of

of each month

in the amount of $
Deft

Per month/year

$

, or Deferred

Use of
Use o f _
Deft_

.to pay debts incurred prior to
.to pay court costs of $

niwn^^fHtn

within .

.days

PLAINTIFF,.

PRAYED e x c e p t P l a i n t i f f 1s awarded
$4bU,U0
p e r month a l i m o n y .
Decree
s
h
a
l
l
n
o
t
become
f
i
n
a
l
u
n
t
i
l
three
Based on stipulation of cousel or on motion of

months after entry.

-..counsel, the court orders:

-of.
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JOHN E. RUNYAN
Attorney for Plaintiff
1441 East 21st South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone: 486-0067

DEPUTY CLERK

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL
a/k/a LEE or LEA GASKILL,
Plaintiff,
vs.

CIVIL NO. D-23691
FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

DON R. GASKILL,
Defendant.

This matter came regularly before the Court on the
17th day of December, 19 76 at the hour of 11:00 p.m. before
the Honorable
there being attendant the plaintiff,-Alberta Fanney Gaskill,
a/k/a Lee or Lea Gaskill, and her attorney, John E. Runyan,
the plaintiff having filed an Appearance and Waiver authorizing
the entry of the Default as per the provisions in the Complaint;
the same was taken note of by the Court and the default entered.
Upon testimony given, the plaintiff established that:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. That plaintiff and defendant are no longer compatible or share mutual love or affection.
2.

That the defendant has absented himself from the

family home for a period in excess of eight months.
3. That the defendant is gainfully employed, earning
approximately $1,500 per month as a construction supervisor and
the plaintiff is presently engaged in the School of Cosmotology
in which she anticipates graduating in approximately 30 months.
4.

That the plaintiff and defendant have made a

physical division of all property belonging to each other with
the defendant receiving as his sole and exclusive property his
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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-2personal effects and a truck, with the plaintiff retaining
the family furniture and a 1971 Toronado automobile.
5.

That the plaintiff and defendant are in the process

of resolving debts and claims arising out of the construction,
fire, sheriff's sale and subsequent sale of redemption on
property located in North Layton, and upon the payment of outstanding bills arising therefrom plaintiff, by agreement of
plaintiff and defendant, is to retain the proceeds as her sole
and exclusive property.
6.

That the defendant pay the plaintiff $450.00 per

month for the remainder of her life, providing, however, that
should the plaintiff re-marry all alimony payments shall cease
forthwith.
7.

That the plaintiff desires to retain her married

name of Lea Alberta F. Gaskill.
8.

That the plaintiff and defendant have agreed that

attorney's fees shall be a claim^and satisfied with the
outstanding debts arising out of the family interest in the
real property as set forth above and to be paid at the time
that the funds are received in conjunction therewith.
9.

That the plaintiff and defendant have been physically

separated for a period in excess of eight months and prior
to that time for an additional period of six months prior
to a temporary reconcilliation during which time both
parties have made plans which would greatly be facilitated
by a waiver of interlocutory periods as required by the
statute.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
From the foregoing facts, the Court determined as
Conclusions of Law that the plaintiff is entitled to the
dissolution of the marriage as prayed in the Complaint,
that the plaintiff shall

retain her married name of Alberta
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-3Fanney Gaskill, aka Lee or Lea Gaskill, and shall receive
the property presently held as her sole and exclusive
property.
That the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment for
alimony in the amount of $450.00 per month for the remainder
of her life, providing, however, that if the plaintiff
should remarry, all alimony payments shall cease forthwith.
That the attorney's fees incident hereto shall be drawn
from funds due plaintiff and defendant out of real property
as interest formerly held
DATED this %0

day

Oeputy Clerk
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JOHN E. RUNYAN
Attorney for Plaintiff \•
1441 East 21st South
>\
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Telephone: 486-0067

OEPurrcLm

?RICT COURT
CC
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL
a/k/a. LEE or LEA GASKILL,
Plaintiff,
JUDGMENT AND DECREE

vs.

CIVIL NO, D-23691

DON R. GASKILL,
Defendant.

Upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed
herein, the following judgment is hereby entered:
1.

That the marriage between the plaintiff and defendant

shall be dissolved and become effective upon the expiration
of 90 days from the date hereof,
2.

That the plaintiff shall retain her married name of

Alberta Fanney Gaskill, a/k/a Lee or Lea Gaskill.
3.

That the plaintiff and defendant shall retain

property
4.

as divided as among them.
That the plaintiff shall receive alimony in the

amount of $450.00 per month for the remainder of her life,
providing, however, that if the plaintiff should remarry,

all

alimony payments shall cease forthwith.
5.

That attorney's fees shall be paid from proceeds

of the sale of real property formerly held byNt}iek plaintiff
and defendant.
DATED this -WCTi day

SAWS*
Judge of the District Court

ATTEST
W. STERLING EVANS
}iER

Deputy Clerk

^<««»*'V.
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^4^i...:.READ R, HELLEWELL of
STRINGHAM, LARSEN, MAZURAN & SABIN
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Plaintiff
200 North Main Street,, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-1501

^T

L. / /

CfcVUfY CLERK

U

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL
a/k/a LEE or LEA GASKILL
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. » 5 » a
DON R. GASKILL,

p -2301

I

Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

ss.

Plaintiff, Alberta Fanney Gaskill a/k/a Lee or Lea
Gaskill,being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

That she is the Plaintiff in the above-named action

and is a resident of Salt Lake County.
2.

That on the 30th day of December, 1976, a Decree of

Divorce was entered by the Honorable James S. Sawaya, one of the
Judges of the above-entitled Court, divorcing Plaintiff and
Defendant.
3.

That under the terms of said Decree, Defendant was

ordered to pay to Plaintiff alimony in the amount of Four Hundred
Fifty Dollars ($450.00) per month for the remainder of her life,
providing, however, that if the Plaintiff should remarry, all
alimony payments shall cease forthwith,
4.

That she is unmarried and is, therefore, entitled to

receive the aforesaid alimony payments.
5.

That during the months of January, February, April,

June, August, September, October, November, and December 1977,
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and also January, February, and March 1978, Defendant has failed
to make any alimony payments in the amount provided under the
above-mentioned Decree and that during the months of March, May,
and July 1977 Defendant has fa.iled to make full alimony payments
in the amount provided under the above-mentioned Decree and is
presently in arrears in said payments in the sum of Six Thousand
Dollars ($6,000,00),
6,

That Defendant's failure

to pay said payments in

the required amounts has imposed an economic hardship on Plaintiff,
7.

That the emotional conflict between the parties is

such that Plaintiff's emotional well being would be enhanced if
Defendant's payments were to be made directly to the Family
Support Division of the Salt Lake County Clerk's Office,
DATED this

'G

day of April, 1978.

JLOL
ALBERTA
& FANNEY GASKILL,
a/k/a LEE or LEA GASKILL
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

G ~~ day of

April, 1978.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing In
My Commission Expires:
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£

•

READ R. HELLEWKLL
661 East 400
Attorney
for South
Plaintiff

'-• " " D IN CLERICS OFRCE

9 Js

**Ul* Coun*y'Ufah

^ '78 '

'^ f ^ ' F ^ s W * !
' ••'
Wftf.clfS^
|f

Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0754

flPT tf 1Q7ft
UL' • "9/tf
"*

w

Deputy CUrk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DI$TVRJCT COURT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH>

D'
ALHERTA FANNKY GASKILL
a/U/a LEE or LfcA GASKILL
Plaintiff,

)

i

)

MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

v.
Civil No. D 23691
DON R. GASKILL
Defendant.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter and moves
the Court for an Order requiring the Defendant to appear and to show
cause, if any he has, why Defendant should not be held in contempt of
Court for failing to pay alimony payments as he was ordered to do by the
terms of the Decree of Divorce entered on the 30th day of December, 1976;
why Judgment should not be entered against Defendant in the amount of
Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000.00); why all future payments should not be
made directly to the Family Support Division of the Salt Lake County Clerk;
and why Defendant should not pay Plaintiff's costs incurred herein, including
a reasonable attorney's fee.
This Motion is based on the pleadings and Plaintiff's Affidavit
which are on file herein.
DATED this

day of September, 1978.

^Hi

READ R. HELLEWELL
Attorney for Plaintiff
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O R D E R

Having read the foregoing Motion and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that Defendant, Don R. Gaskill, personally
appear before the Honorable Peter F. Leary, one of the Judges of the aboveentitled Court at the Courts Building, 240 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City,
Utah, on Wednesday, the 11th day of October, 1978, at 10 a.m. and then and
there to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of Court; why all
future payments should not be made directly to Family Support Division of
the Salt Lake County Clerk; why hevshould not have Judgment entered against
him in the amount of Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000.00); and why he should not
pay Plaintiff's costs incurred herein, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
DATED this

Q

day of September, 1978.
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Before me the u n d e r s i g n e d

a u t h o r i t y , on this

day did p e r s o n a l l y

CV,^v^

appear

\kc^oXt >

who being first d u l y s w o r n did d e p o s e and say
-as f o l l o w s :
She

is a Deputy C o n s t a b l e

H a r r i s , State of T e x a s
service of the c i t a t i o n
(LlufTio. & b j * *?./
5

of the C o u n t y of

and that he has e x e c u t e d
in the c a u s e

and e n t i t l e d ^ D»„RG*~hLu
day of

jQ^cdCisvwJbtsi

19 7&

numbered
on the

at_

to D,<^ id B<u^>&JU a copy of the

by d e l i v e r i n g
above n u m b e r e d

and e n t i t l e d

cause.

Dep u t y / .
-^

v^

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE M E ,

this _ / £ _

^ y of ,JjJj~

,

19^
y

NOTARY PUBLIC frf and f o r
Harris Codnty, T e x a s , , .
My commission e x p i r e s
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1 FILMED]
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE - STATE OF UTAH
;-?'/•

G'/',,/,// AtA'A'

•

MINUTE ORDER

Plaintiff

Case*

{Q-JZtilf

Jj

Type of hearing.

Div-

Present:
PltfP. Arty /d I
/ *</*>
D. Atty
,M r' • S /$<
Sworn & Examined:
Pltf
Others _

-Other-

-OSC-

- Annul-

_Deft—Ct/'/i)
y'/><^-s/^
W£/£^

Summons.
-StipulationWaiver
-PublicationDefault:
Pltf.
DeftDate:
SO ~//~ ? fr
Judge -sjf&c/ki^
*?Zf<&Ly
Clerk: Q g A* i^ar^
_
"TT
Reporter: ?r'fl<rdp d>y
Bailiff:
Jfajfa'

.Deft.

ORDERS:
Counseling ordered
Custody study ordered.
Custody awarded to
Visitation rights

.Reasonable, or:_

Support.

=$_

-per month

Payments to be made thru the clerks office
each month, or V* by the
Atty tees to the
Home to Pltf
Furnishings to Pltf

Alimony

Auto to Pltf

of

of each month

in the amount of $

Deft

Per month/year

Payments to be made by the

and % by the-

Deft

$

, or Deferred

Use of
Use of
Deft

.to pay debts incurred prior to
.to pay court costs of $
Divorce granted to-

within

days

-as_

Based ontttpolaftorrofnsecftetWFon motion of
.counsel, the court orders: x £ J O

/^*lf^

o/s/e~

/

Page.

1

of_^L
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL,
aka LEE or LEA GASKILL,

I

I
Plaintiff,

X
vs.

NO. D-23691

X
DON R. GASKILL,

I
Defendant.

X
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO AMEND DECREE OF DIVORCE

STATE OF UTAH

X

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

X

Comes now DON R. GASKILL and petitions the Court, as
follows:
1.

That he is the defendant above named.

2.

That on or about the 18th of September 1976, while

a resident of the State of California, the said DON R. GASKILL
received by mail a proposed consent and waiver in connection
with the foregoing divorce matter.
the consent and waiver

That in addition to receiving

the said DON R. GASKILL received a copy

of the complaint of the plaintiff, which complaint, in paragraph
8 thereof, provided that the defendant pay to the plaintiff alimony in the sum of $700 per month for 30 months, and $450 per
month thereafter for life.
3.

That your affiant executed the consent and waiver forwarded

to him, but in said consent and waiver wrote in the words"omit para. 8
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on complaint."

For reference, defendant attaches hereto copy of

said consent and waiver, as filed with the court,
4.

That it was the intent of your affiant, Don R. Gaskill,

that the decree of divorce entered in the above entitled matter be
entered upon the basis that no alimony be awarded to the plaintiff,
and for this reason the notation, as aforesaid, was entered upon the
consent and waiver.
5.

That apparently the court, notwithstanding the intent

to omit the alimony requested by plaintiff's complaint, entered an
order awarding to plaintiff the sum of $450 per month as alimony,
the same being against the wishes, will and consent of the defendant, Don R. Gaskill.
6.

That by reason of the fact that the court failed to •

acknowledge the provision of the defendant, Don R. Gaskill, to omit
the alimony provision contained in plaintiff's complaint, the court
entered its order awarding alimony to plaintiff in the sum of $450
per month, and that the same constitutes a mistake and error, as
provided by Rule 60b(7), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and that
the court therefore should allow an amendment and modification of
the decree of divorce, in conformance with the consent of the said
defendant, Don R. Gaskill, striking from said decree of divorce
the provision with regard to alimony, the same to be done nunc pro
tunc.
7.

That the defendant, Don R. Gaskill, at no time submitted

his person or intended to submit his person to the jurisdiction of
this court for purposes of considering or entering any money judgment against him.
8.

That no notice was given to the defendant, Don R. Gaskill,

that the court would hear, consider or decide the claim for alimony,
and, consequently, the said defendant did not have the opportunity
to appear and oppose the claim.
9.

That the defendant, Don R. Gaskill had no notice of the

judgment against him for alimony until he was served with a motion
for contempt, and that he immediately upon being so served took
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steps to bring this matter to the attention of the court by retaining counsel.
WHEREFORE, defendant prays the court to enter its order
amending and modifying the decree of divorce herein, to strike
from said decree the provision of said decree awarding to the
plaintiff alimony in the sum of $450 per month, and to make said
order effective nunc pro tunc.
Dated

this___^2A__

day of October, 1978.

Don R. Gaskill ^

STATE OF TEXAS
COUNTY OF HARRIS
DON R. GASKILL, being first duly sworn upon his oath,
deposes and states as follows:
That he is the defendant and petitioner above named; that
he has read the foregoing petition and knows the contents thereof,
and that the same is true of his own knowledge, except as to matters therein stated upon information and belief, and as to those
matters he believes it to be true.

Don R. Gaskill
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s ^ i f / ^ 7
October, 1978.
Y.V -

day o f

My Commi&ison Expires:
Notary P
County, Texas
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JOHN E. RUNYAN
Attorney for Plaintiff
4625 South 2300 Sast
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: 278=0431
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL
a/k/a LEE or LEA GASKILL,
Plaintiff,
CONSENT AND WAIVER

Civil No.

DON R. GASKILL,

D-J?3&f7

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
) ss.
)

DON R. GASKILL, being first duly sworn, deposes and
says:

That he is the defendant in the above-entitled action;

that he acknowledges the receipt of a copy of the Complaint
in the foregoing action, enters his appearance and consent
herein, waives service of Summons upon him, waives time
within which to answer or otherwise plead this said Complaint
and consents that his default may be entered and that the
Court may proceed to hear and determine said cause at any
time and without notice to said

•i

,

V*

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

day of

, 1976.
NOTARY PUBLIC //
Residing at ^ Z ^ W U v ^ u /
^
My commission expires: /?''">?
g-/-7$
MW¥MXXMM>»**

OFFICIAL SEAL

BARBARA J. HULSE
NOTARY PUBLIC • CALIfOANIA
PRINCIPAL OFFICE IN
LOS ANUILW CUUNH
My Commission Expire August 1. 1979

j

\**wm*<**t< %MK»I»I»'»*»»« »»Ljuirinfu JIU
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Nov I 3 59PM'78 x
WALTER R ELLETT

ATTORNEY FOR

Defendant

UTV0L?ffif

8086 SOUTH STATC S T R U T

MURRAY. UTAH 84107
TBUIPHONC: 266-3878

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

ALBERTA PANNEY GASKILL,
aka LEE or LEA GASKILL

No.

D-23691

Plaintiff
AMENDED
NOTICE OF HEARING

vs.
D O N R . GASKILL
Defendant

* * *
TO THE PLAINTIFF, and to her attorney, READ R. HELLEWELL:
YOU AND EACH OF YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that
the modification hearing in the above entitled matter, heretofore scheduled
to be heard on Friday, the 10th day of November 1978, at 2:00 p. m., has
now been scheduled to be heard on Tuesday, the 21st day of November 1978,
at 3:30 p. m., before a judge to be assigned.
Dated this 31st day of October 1978. .
WATKER R. ELLEQ

Mailed copy of the foregoing to Read R. Hellewell, Attorney for Plaintiff,
200 North Main Street - Suite 200, Salt ^ake City, Utah 84103/\his 31st
day of October 1978.
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COUNTY,UTAH

Nov 14 12 i s ?H '78
WALTER R. ELI

ad ant

ATTORNEY FOR

VJ

8088 S O U T H 6 T A T £ S T R U T

MURRAY, UTAH 84107
TCLftPHONC: 266-3B7S

^

DEPUTY CURX

?

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD IUDJOAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKl^STAgrE OF UTAH

til*
ALBERT A PANNEY GASKILL,
aka LEE or LEA GASKILL

No. D-23691

Plaintiff
SPECIAL APPEARANCE
OF COUNSEL

vs.
DON R. GASKILL
Defendant

* * *
Comes now Walter R. Ellett, and specially enters his appearance as counsel for the defendant, Don R. Gaskill, in the above entitled
matter, lor the specific purpose of challenging, on behalf of the said
Don 11. Gaskill, the authority of the court to enter a personal judgment
for alimony in connection with the divorce decree entered in the above
entitled matter.
Dated this

/ 3

'

day of November 1978.
WALTER R. ELLE1

rney Appearing/Spec
Defendant, Don R / G a skill
Mailed copy of the foregoing to Read R. Hellewell, Attorney for Plaintiff,
200 North Main Street - Suite 200, SLCU 84103, this 13th dajr of November
1978.
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I IL1VICU J

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE - STATE OF UTAH
T^

Plaintiff

MINUTE ORDER

\

Case#

\J

Defendant

Type of hearing:
Preserft: ^\

V

Div_
Pltf..
niT.

-AnnulDeft.
uen

^

P. A„Y <Xc « r X v V .
. Atty.
Sworn & Examined:
Pitt

-OSC_J

v\«a\V <gU>5\]

-Other-

Summons.
Waiver

.Stipulation.
-Publication..

ault: i \ Pltf

.^ .

_,_,^

p

NQNr^^WT^
Date:
ClerkTT^^^K^ X V T ^

.Deft.

Others.

BailiffH^KKA \ P \ ^ 3

-

ORDERS:
Counseling ordered
Custody study ordered.
Custody awarded to
Visitation rights

. Reasonable, or:.

Support.

-per month

Payments to be made thru the clerks office
each month, or 'it by the
Atty rees to the
Home to Pltf
Furnishings to Pltf

Alimon

Auto to Pltf

of

-of each month

in the amount of $

Deft

Per month/year

Payments to be made by the

and % by the-

Deft

S

, or Deferred

Use of
Use of__
Deft.

.to pay debts incurred prior to
.to pay court costs of $

within

days

Divorce granted to_
Based on stipulation of cousel or on motion of

.counsel, the court orders:

A' v -A-s ( Oi«<-Acb ^V\.oaQoi*^s-zA5& r ~\>S^^

Page.Law School,
. o fBYU.
.
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE - STATE OF UTAH
FILE NO.
YlTLE:

(-/PARTIES PRESENT)

COUNSEL:

D 23691

K COUNSEL PRESENT)

ABERTA FANNEY GASKILL, a/k/a,

VS
DON R. GASKILL

I

JOAN BLY

II I I 'I

li

11

'

T T

CLERK

HON.

JAMES S . SAWAYA
JUDGE

REPORTER

DATE: JULY 2. 1979

BAILIFF

THTS MATTRR HAVTNG HERETOFORE BEEN HEARD BY THIS COURT AND TAKEN UNDERADVISEMENT. COURT
m j STATER NF.TTHER PARTY HAVING FIXED THE MEMORANDUM ORDERED BY THE COURT ,THE PETITION
TS DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
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FILE!)
DISTRICT OOURT

f r-

Dec 10 II28 AH'31
BRENT D. YOUNG
I V I E & YOUNG

(3584)

Attorneys for Defendant
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603
Telephone: 375-3000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, aka
LEE or LEA GASKILL,
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT
OF ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Plaintiff,
vs.
DON R. GASKILL,

Civil No. -£=2349-1

Defendant
aanr.
STATE OF
ss,

County of

)

DON R. GASKILL, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am the defendant in the above-entitled case.

2.

I was divorced from Mrs. Gaskill on December 30, 1976,

3.

In October, 1978, Mrs. Gaskill filed a petition

seeking contempt, and a judgment for delinquent alimony.
4.

I answered the Petition on or about 8 September, 1976,

and claimed that the consent and waiver which I signed on 8
September, 1976, had handwritten in my handwriting "omit
paragraph 8 on complaint".

With the understanding, paragraph

8, which concerned alimony, would be omitted, I signed the
consent and waiver.

Paragraph 8 on the complaint was a claim
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*

for alimony in the amount of $450 per month for the balance of
Mrs. Gaskill's life.
5.
1978.

Apparently the matter was argued before the court in

The court took it under advisement.

Neither party

furnished any written memorandum as requested by the court, and
the matter, on July 2, 1979, was dismissed without prejudice.
There has been no activity since then.
ex-wife frequently since then.

I have spoken with my

She has never made a claim for

delinquent alimony until she brought the judgment to the State
of Washington.
6.

I learned in the last few months that for a period of

several months in the early 1980s Mrs. Gaskill resided with
another man.

As a defense to her claim for judgment for

delinquent alimony against me in Washington pursuant to the
Utah Decree for the amount of many tens of thousands of
dollars, her deposition was taken.

She was asked in that

deposition whether she has resided with anyone else.

She

refused to answer that question.
7.

I am asking the Utah court to enter an order

authorizing my attorney to send an exemplified copy of a
statement by the court to the Washington court providing that:
(a)

I have filed a Petition in the Utah court

seeking to:
(1) have the Utah court make a determination as

2
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I

to the validity of that portion of the Decree which
provides for alimony;
(2) have the Utah court determine whether by
her conduct and my conduct Mrs. Gaskill has waived
her claim for alimony;
(3) have the Utah court determine whether Mrs.
Gaskill is statutorily precluded because of the
allegation that she has lived with another man.
Dated t h i s

o^'

day o f

/AzsS&*~/<&4~ r ,

1991.

DON R. GASKILL

. Subscribed and sworn td^-Cefdre me this
Notary Public
My Commission Expires:

(3

Residing at:

— ^ . y u M , , „:,,;;{
^*7
gaskill/2.12
•

-•'•."•

k

'•••• : •

'..

" ?

/

'J- v.

i * '
• w «> N s> • ' V
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Third Juu.ctal District

DEC 1 0 1991
BRENT D. YOUNG (3584)
IVIE & YOUNG
'SAULAKEl
Attorneys for Defendant
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603
Telephone: 375-3000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, aka
LEE or LEA GASKILL,
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT
OF ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. .-a-3363-1-

DON R. GASKILL,
Defendant.
STATE OF
County of

JUDGE JAMES S.SAWAYA

I'ju, ' co^rn
>
', • / •

-t

ss,
)

DON R. GASKlCL, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am the defendant in the above-entitled case,

2.

I was divorced from Mrs. Gaskill on December 30, 1976.

3.

In October, 1978, Mrs. Gaskill filed a petition

seeking contempt, and a judgment for delinquent alimony.
4.

I answered the Petition on or about 8 September, 1976,

and claimed that the consent and waiver which I signed on 8
September, 1976, had handwritten in my handwriting "omit
paragraph 8 on complaint". With the understanding, paragraph
8, which concerned alimony, would be omitted, I signed the
consent and waiver.

Paragraph 8 on the complaint was n claim
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*<?

for alimony in the amount of $450 per month for the balance of
Mrs. Gaskill's life.
5.
1978.

Apparently the matter was argued before the court in

The court took it under advisement.

Neither party

furnished any written memorandum as requested by the court, and
the matter, on July 2, 1979, was dismissed without prejudice.
There has been no activity since then.
ex-wife frequently since then.

I have spoken with my

She has never made a claim for

delinquent alimony until she brought the judgment to the State
of Washington.
6.

I learned in the last few months that for a period of

several months in the early 1980s Mrs. Gaskill resided with
another man.

As a defense to her claim for judgment for

delinquent alimony against me in Washington pursuant to the
Utah Decree for the amount of many tens of thousands of
dollars, her deposition was taken.

She was asked in that

deposition whether she has resided with anyone else.

She

refused to answer that question.
7.. I am asking the Utah court to enter an order
authorizing my attorney to send an exemplified copy of a
statement by the court to the Washington court providing that:
(a)

I have filed a Petition in the Utah court

seeking to:
(1)

have the Utah court make a determination as

2
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1

to the validity of that portion of the Decree which
provides for alimony;
(2) have the Utah court determine whether by
her conduct and my conduct Mrs. Gaskill has waived
her claim for alimony;
(3) have the Utah court determine whether Mrs,
Gaskill is statutorily precluded because of the
allegation that she has lived with another man.
Dated this d?C day of

/ l<'r^&c

y

, 1991.

DON R. GASKILL^
Subscribed and sworn tdHief^re me this LtJ^*9y
Notary Public
My Commission Expires:

/ N

~\
^_j

Residing at:

gaskill/2.12
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BRENT D. YOUNG (3584)
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Defendant
48 North University Avenue
P.O, Box 672
Provo, UT 84603
Telephone: 375-3000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, aka
LEE or LEA GASKILL,

MOTION FOR
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Plaintiff,
Civil No.

G-2Z&9±-

vs.
DON R. GASKILL,
Defendant,
Defendant, by and through his attorney, moves the court
for an order to show cause why the court should not certify to
the court in the state of Washington that the following issues
are before the Utah court:
(1) Whether there is a valid decree ordering the
defendant to pay alimony;
(2) Whether the court should modify nunc pro tunc THE
decree to reflect the written consent of the defendant which
did not provide for alimony;
(3) Whether the plaintiff has abandoned her claim for
alimony because of her refusal to pursue the issue in 1979;
(4) Whether the plaintiff has waived her claim for
alimony based upon her conduct generally; and
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(5) Whether the plaintiff has, pursuant to Title 30-3-5,
by her conduct terminated her claim for alimony.
This motion is based on the affidavit of defendant filed
herewith.
Dated this ^

day of

. 1991.

BRENT D. ^OUNC^
otsc/dom/cl4
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FILED
DlSTRlC'GOUR 1

UECIO
BRENT D. YOUNG
IVIE & YOUNG

II25 AH '91

(3584)

Attorneys for Defendant
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603
Telephone: 375-3000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, aka
LEE or LEA GASKILL,
VERIFIED
PETITION TO MODIFY
DECREE

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No.

DON R. GASKILL,
Defendant.

D 23691

.IUDS5 JAMES S. SAWAYA

Defendant petitions the court for an order modifying the
Decree nunc pro tunc, or in the alternative, to modify it by
terminating alimony effective the date Mrs. Gasklll began
living with another man.

The specific reasons for this

Petition are set forth as follows:
1.

I am the defendant in the above-entitled case,

2.

I was divorced from Mrs. Gasklll on December 30, 1976.

3.

In October, 1978, Mrs. Gasklll filed a petition

seeking contempt, and a judgment for delinquent alimony.
4.

I answered the Petition on or about 8 September, 1976,

and claimed that the consent and waiver which I signed on 8
September, 1976, had handwritten in my handwriting "omit
paragraph 8 on complaint".

i

With the understanding, paragraph

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

000034

8, which concerned alimony, would be omitted, I signed the
consent and waiver.

Paragraph 8 on the complaint was a claim

for alimony in the amount of $450 per month for the balance of
Mrs. Gaskill's life.
5.
1978.

Apparently the matter was argued before the court in

The court took it under advisement.

Neither party

furnished any written memorandum as requested by the court, and
the matter, on July 2, 1979, was dismissed without prejudice.
There has been no activity since then.
ex-wife frequently since then.

I have spoken with my

She has never made a claim for

delinquent alimony until she brought the judgment to the State
of Washington.
6.

I learned in the last few months that for a period of

several months in the early 1980s Mrs. Gaskill resided with
another man.

As a defense to her claim for judgment for

delinquent alimony against me in Washington pursuant to the
Utah Decree for the amount of many tens of thousands of
dollars, her deposition was taken.

She was asked in that

deposition whether she has resided with anyone else. She
refused to answer that question.
7.

I am asking the Utah court to enter an order

authorizing my attorney to send an exemplified copy of a
statement by the court to the Washington court providing that:
(a)

I have filed a Petition in the Utah court

2
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seeking to:
(1) have the Utah court make a determination as
to the validity of that portion of the Decree which
provides for alimony;
(2) have the Utah court determine whether by
her conduct and my conduct Mrs. Gaskill has waived
her claim for alimony;
(3) have the Utah court determine whether Mrs.
Gaskill is statutorily precluded because of the
allegation that she has lived with another man.
WHEREFORE plaintiff prays as follows:
(1) To have the Utah court make a determination as to the
validity of that portion of the Decree which provides for
alimony;
(2) To have the Utah court determine whether by
plaintiff's conduct and defendant's conduct Mrs. Gaskill has
waived her claim for alimony;
(3) To have the Utah court determine whether Mrs. Gaskill
is statutorily precluded because of the allegation that she has
lived with another man;
(4)

»

For such other and further relief as the court deems
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j u s t in the premises.
Dated t h i s 3£ day of _ ^ 4 ^ * ^ .<r

i-

1991.

DON

BRENT D. YOUNG

if

STATE OF (/OflSh'nCVlftTPl
ss.
County of K j ' n f l <
)
DON R. GASKILL, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he is the person who executed the foregoing instrument;
that he has read the same and knows the contents thereof; that
the matters stated therein are true of his own knowledge,
except such matters as stated to be upon information and
belief, and as to those matters, he believes them to be true.

ubscribed and swc
sworn to
Subscribed
of K\h/^fY)lX<-<.
1991.
Notary Public
My Commission Expires:

Residing a t :

•IP-/-^4
petition/dom/c8-ll
..- N \ v .
-• v ' •

..'• x> 'it
'.v'v h

•3
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HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247)
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN
Attorney for Plaintiff
Third Floor, New York Building
48 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-6996
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, a/k/a
LEE or LEA GASKILL,
Plaintiff,
v.

NOTICE OF CONTINUANCE
OF HEARING ON DEFENDANT'S
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Civil No. 764923691

DON R. GASKILL,
Judge James S. Sawaya
Defendant.
•ooOooTO:

Defendant, DON R. GASKILL, and his attorney of record, BRENT
D. YOUNG.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the hearing on Defendant's Order to

Show Cause originally scheduled for January 13, 1992, has been
continued to January 29, 1992 at the hour of 2:00 p.m., before the
Honorable Commissioner Michael Evans, or as soon thereafter as
counsel may be heard.
DATED this 10th day of January, 1992.
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN

HELEN E. CHRISTIAN
Attorney for Plaintiff
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct
copy

of

the

foregoing

NOTICE

OF

CONTINUANCE

OF

HEARING

ON

DEFENDANT'S ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE, by placing same in the United
States mail, postage prepaid, on this 10th day of January, 1992,
addressed to:
BRENT D. YOUNG
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Defendant
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603

Kay J. Slahtasky
gasklll.ncon
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EILEO
DlSTRlcf C0UR1
BRENT D. YOUNG (3584)
. ir 8 57 1\M '3Z
Di H
ilAH IU
I VIEfiYOUNG
Attorneys for Plaintiff
]Hihi>o » l P^l^L
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT
84603
Telephone: 375-3000
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, aka
LEE or LEA GASKILL,
SUMMONS
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. J)

DON R. GASKILL,

^Sb^l

Defendant.
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT:
You are hereby summoned and required to file an answer in
writing to the attached Complaint with the Clerk of the
above-entitled court, Utah County Courthouse, 125 N. 100 West,
Provo, Utah, 84601, and to serve upon, or mail to BRENT D.
YOUNG, at 48 North University Avenue, Provo, Utah, plaintiff's
attorney, a copy of said answer, within (thirty) 30 days after
service of this summons upon you.
If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken
against you for the relief demanded in said Complaint, which
has been filed with the Clerk of said court and a copy of which
is attached hereto and herewith served upon you.
Dated:

XL

Please serve:
y x
Defendant
Pia"VitTt

7

. 1991.
BTRENT D. YOUNG A
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BRENT D. YOUNG (3584)
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Defendant
48 North University Avenue
p.o.

^-i !u..tcou;rY
L

'

BOX 672

«.r,-,.;~r"

Provo, UT 84603
Telephone: 375-3000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, aka
LEE or LEA GASKILL,
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE. ~,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. P-aa6Ql
vs.

Jul?!?*. JAMES S. SAWAYA

DON R. GASKILL,
Defendant.
TO THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFF:

You are hereby ordered to appear before the
above-entitled court at the County Courthouse, Salt Lake City,
Utah, on the l^ih
at

cJ- <vQ

ddiA of

U&OUtU-iy

19?#^

/p .m», then and there to show cause, if any

you have, why the court should not certify to the court in the
state of Washington that the following issues are before the
Utah court:
(1) Whether there is a valid decree ordering the
defendant to pay alimony;
(2) Whether the court should modify nunc pro tunc THE
decree to reflect the written consent of the defendant which
did not provide for alimony;

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

000041

(3) Whether the plaintiff has abandoned her claim for
alimony because of her refusal to pursue the issue in 1979;
(4) Whether the plaintiff has waived her claim for
alimony based upon her conduct generally; and
(5) Whether the plaintiff has, pursuant to Title 30-3-5,
by her conduct terminated her claim for alimony.
These claims of the defendant and the relief prayed for
are particularly described in ths affidavit served herewith.
This ordsr and tVxe affidavit v/ill be served upon you at least
five days prior to the day above specified.

Dated:

JL1PC(

-'iAi

/P,
BV'THE
^

Please serve:
Plaintiff

otsc/dom/12

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

000042

YO'JNtf & YUUNG
P.'J. UUX b/2
PRUVU, U I' 846UJ
T e l e p h o n e : (ouu) OOU uuoo
A t t o r n e y f o r ; ALBfcKI' i"ANNLY GASK1LL

IhiKU U1£S"« RIC'l CUURI
P l a i h t ' l f f ; ALdtiKTA hANNfcY uASKiLL
D e f e n d a n t : UUN K. CASK I L L , LI AL
htiai m g :
01/VJ/92
U2:UU

Proof of Service
Case No. D23691
Pile No, 91-0U7b83-Q

1. At the tlpie of service i was at least 18 years of age and not a party to
this action, and : served copies of the:
SUMMONS AND UKUfcR 10 SHOW CAUSfc
Party served:

ALbtKVA PANNLY GASK1LL, AKA
LLL UK LtA CASK1LL
2bU0 SPRINGS KU. 32 b 2
VALLtJU, CA. 94b91

3. I served the party named In Item 2
a. by personally delivering the copies
11 ) on (.date) :
12-25-91
(2; at (time ) :
1 i :b8 a.m.
4. Notice to the Person Served (on the Summons) was completed as follows:
a. As an individual defendant.
b. Person serving: PA! RICK riANZLR
County of Solano
boU union avenue, Ste 10U
l-au field/ CA 94b33

6. Service Fee: $20.00

Phone: (707) 421-7020

7. i am a California sherirr and i certify that the foregoing 1s true
and correct.

Date: DtCfcMBfcK 'I'll '.yj't
J ud . Coun . I or m , r u 1 e y 8 2 (
.
.
.
•
« ) ( 2J)

Sher
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HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247)
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN
Attorney for Plaintiff
Third Floor, New York Building
48 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-6996
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, a/k/a
LEE or LEA GASKILL,

PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER TO
DEFENDANT'S VERIFIED
PETITION TO MODIFY
DECREE OF DIVORCE

Plaintiff,
v.
DON R. GASKILL,

Civil No. 764923691
Defendant.

Judge James S. Sawaya
ooOoo

Plaintiff, ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, aka LEA GASKILL, by and
through her attorney, Helen E. Christian, hereby files this Answer
to Defendant's Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, and
responds as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
Defendant's Verified Petition to Modify Decree fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
Defendant's Verified Petition to Modify Decree fails to allege
a substantial change of circumstances that has occurred that would
justify modification of the Decree of Divorce entered in this
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action.
ANSWER
1.

Plaintiff admits the allegations contained in Paragraphs

1 and 2 of Defendant's Petition.
2.

Plaintiff admits the allegations contained in Paragraph

3 of Defendant's Petition, and affirmatively states that she has
tried to collect alimony arrearages from the Defendant in the past,
but has been unsuccessful.
3.

Plaintiff denies the allegations contained in Paragraph

4 of Defendant's Petition, and affirmatively states that Paragraph
8 of the Complaint for Divorce contained a claim for alimony in the
amount of $750.00 until Plaintiff had completed cosmetology school,
and then the amount of $450.00 thereafter until such time as
Plaintiff remarried or died.
4.

Plaintiff admits the allegations contained in Paragraph

5 of Defendant's Petition to the extent that this matter was before
the Court in 1978, but denies the remainder of that paragraph.
5.

Plaintiff denies the allegations contained in Paragraph

6 of Defendant's Petition and affirmatively states that even ij[ she
had cohabited with a member of the opposite sex for a few months in
the early 1980s, Defendant is now barred from basing his failure to
pay alimony to Plaintiff on those grounds.
6.

Plaintiff is without sufficient information as to the

truth or falsity of the allegations contained in Paragraph 7 of
2
i
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Defendant's Petition, and therefore denies the same,
7.

Plaintiff denies each and every other allegation not

specifically herein admitted, modified or denied.
WHEREFORE, Having responded to the allegations contained in
Defendant's Verified Petition to Modify Decree, Plaintiff prays
that the same be dismissed and that Defendant take nothing thereby.
DATED this

day of January, 1992.
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN

lU^_ ?,

HELEN E. CHRISTIAN
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF TELECOPIER AND MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be faxed and mailed a true
and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER TO DEFENDANT'S
VERIFIED PETITION TO MODIFY DECREE OF DIVORCE by placing same in
the United States rnai', postage prepaid, on this

day of

January, 1992, addressee to:
Brent D. Your
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys fc Defendant
48 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84603

Kay J. Slahtasky
ga0ki.11.an8
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HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247)
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN
Attorney for Plaintiff
Third Floor, New York Building
48 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-6996

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, a/k/a
LEE or LEA GASKILL,
Plaintiff,
v.
DON R. GASKILL,

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
Civil No. 764923691

Defendant.

Judge James S. Sawaya
ooOoo

:—

Plaintiff, ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, a/k/a LEA GASKILL, by and
through her attorney, Helen E. Christian, hereby

files this

response in opposition to Defendant's Motion for Order to Show
Cause.
PERTINENT FACTS
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant were divorced by a Decree of

Divorce entered in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, on December 30, 1976, in Case No. D23691, by Judge
James S. Sawaya.
2.

The Decree of Divorce provided, among other things, that

Defendant was ordered to pay alimony to Plaintiff in the amount of
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$450.00 per month, "for the remainder of her life" or until
Plaintiff remarried, at which time alimony payments would cease.
3.

Prior to entry of the Decree of Divorce, Defendant

executed a Consent and Waiver, a copy of which is attached hereto
as Exhibit "B", wherein he waived the time within which to answer
or otherwise plead to the allegations of Plaintiff's Complaint for
Divorce, consented that his default may be entered , and that the
Court could proceed to hear the matter without further notice to
him.
4.

Defendant claims that the handwritten notation on the

Consent and Waiver he signed, which reads "omit #8 on Complaint",
is a sufficient basis upon which to deny alimony to Plaintiff.
5.

Defendant has failed to pay any amount of alimony to

Plaintiff, and the arrearages from the date of the first payment,
January 1, 1977 through January 1, 1992, a period of fifteen years,
would be $81,000, plus interest on those amounts as each payment
became due and payable.
ARGUMENT
Defendant asks this Court to determine whether there is a
valid Decree of Divorce requiring him to pay alimony to the
Plaintiff.

Defendant executed his Consent and Waiver in this

action on September 8, 1976, almost four months before the hearing
held before Judge Sawaya on the divorce.

Plaintiff testified at

that hearing that she had asked in her Complaint for alimony in the

2
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amount of $750.00 per month until she completed her schooling/ and
the amount of $450.00 to continue after that time until she
remarried or died, but that she wanted the Court to enter its award
of $450.00 per month from the commencement of the award instead.
Defendant

is estopped, nearly sixteen years later, from

claiming that he should not have been required to pay alimony to
Plaintiff.

Notwithstanding Defendant's handwritten statement on

the Consent and Waiver/ he did execute that document and waived his
rights to contest the allegations in the Complaint

filed by

Plaintiff.
Defendant is further estopped from seeking relief from this
Court as he comes before it with unclean hands, having failed to
pay any amount of alimony as ordered in the Decree of Divorce.
Defendant next claims that Plaintiff has waived her right to
alimony for several reasons. First, he claims that she has waived
her right to alimony because she failed to pursue the Motion she
brought before the Court in 1978, asking the Court to find
Defendant in contempt for his failure to pay alimony and to award
her judgment for the arrearages owing up to that time.

This

argument is simply without basis in law or fact, and the fact that
Plaintiff failed to pursue an enforcement action, for whatever
reason, does not constitute a waiver of her right to do. so in the
future.
Second, Defendant claims that Plaintiff has waived her right

3
i
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to alimony because of her conduct generally, but fails to state any
specific

examples

of

her

conduct.

If Defendant

refers

to

Plaintiff's conduct in attempting to seek enforcement of her right
to alimony in the State of Washington, a recipient's right to
enforce an award of alimony does not constitute conduct that would
justify its termination.

On the other hand, Defendant's conduct

has been contemptible throughout these proceedings, as he has
failed to comply with the Order of the Court.
Finally, Defendant claims that Plaintiff has waived her right
to alimony because Defendant believes that Plaintiff was, at one
time during

the pendency

of Defendant's

residing with a member of the opposite sex.

alimony

obligation,

Defendant cites

S 30-3- 5, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) in support of his
position.

Defendant finds support in the following language of

that section:
(6) Any order of the court that a
party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the
party paying alimony that the former
spouse is* residing with a person of
the opposite sex. . . .
(Emphasis added.)
There are two problems with Defendant's claim that Plaintiff
has terminated her right to alimony under this section.

First,

Defendant failed to establish that Plaintiff was residing with a
person of the opposite sex, and second, Defendant was required to
establish that fact at the time of the alleged cohabitation.
4
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His

failure to do either one is fatal to Defendant's claim under this
section.
CONCLUSION
Defendant has failed to pay alimony to Plaintiff for a period
of sixteen years. Defendant now seeks to avoid paying alimony to
Plaintiff by making claims that are without merit and not supported
by fact or law.

Plaintiff

is entitled to judgment against

Defendant for alimony arrearages that have accrued since entry of
the Decree of Divorce, including interest on each payment as it
became due# as well as her attorney's fees and costs incurred in
defending against this action.
WHEREFORE,

Plaintiff

asks this Court

to

award

her the

following relief:
1.

Deny Defendant's Motion for Order to Show Cause;

2.

Award

judgment

in

favor

of

Plaintiff

and

against

Defendant in the amount of the alimony arrearages owing, including
interest on each payment as it became due and payable;
3.

Award

judgment

in

favor

of

Plaintiff

and

against

Defendant for Plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs incurred in
defending against this action in the amount of $450.00; and
4.

Award Plaintiff such other and further relief as the

Court deems just and proper in the premises.

5
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this l \

day of January, 1992,
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN

HELEN E. CHRISTIAN
Attorney for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF TELECOPIER AND MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be faxed and mailed a true
and

correct

copy

of

the

foregoing

PLAINTIFF'S

RESPONSE

IN

OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND MOTION
FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT, by placing same in the United States mail,
postage prepaid, on thlScOl

day of January, 1992, addressed to:

BRENT D. YOUNG
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Defendant
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603

gasklll.ropp
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HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247)
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN
Attorney for Plaintiff
Third Floor, New York Building
48 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-6996
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, a/k/a
LEE or LEA GASKILL,
Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF HEARING ON
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

v.
Civil No. 764923691

DON R. GASKILL,
Defendant.

Judge James S. Sawaya
-ooOoo-

TO:

Defendant, DON R. GASKILL, and his attorney of record, BRENT
D. YOUNG
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the a hearing on PLAINTIFF'S MOTION

FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT has been scheduled for January 29, 1992, at
the hour of 2:00 p.m., before the Honorable Commissioner Michael
Evans, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard.
DATED this

TA^day of January, 1992.
GUSTIN, GREEN, STEGALL & L]

HELEN E. CHRISTIAN
Attorney for Plaintiff

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

000053

CERTIFICATE OF TELECOPIER AND MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be faxed and mailed a true
and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT, by placing same in the United States
mail/ postage prepaid, on thlsrO 1

day of January, 1992, addressed

to:
BRENT D. YOUNG
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Defendant
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603

gaekill.nhea
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY .:
GASKILL, ALBERTA FANNEY
. PLAINTIFF

VS
GASKILL, DON R

a

CASE NUMBER 764923691 DA
I
DATE 01/29/92
?
:".
HONORABLE MICHAEI, S, EVANS
COURT REPORTER TAPE-l-*19$22-f 2«7
COURT CLERK CPW

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
MOTION HEARING
PRESENT: DEFENDANT
#

P. ATTY. CHRISTIAN, HELEN
D. ATTY. YOUNG, BRENT

!

*
COMMISSIONER RECOMMENDS:
£ -:M- '-:•
1. PURSUANT TO AGREEMENT OF COUNSEL, COMMISSIONER WILL HEAR
ARGUMENT ON SPECIFIC ISSUES IDENTIFIED ON THE RECORD &
COMMISSIONER TO MAKE HIS RECOMMENDATIONS ON THOSE ISSUES,•
2. COUNSEL ALSO AGREED THAT DISCOVERY CONTINUE BEYOND THE DATE
OF THE ENTRY OF COMMISSIONER'S RECOMMENDATIONS. 3. COUNSEL AGREED THAT RECOMMENDATION NOT HAVE THE EFFECT OF
—
ORDER OF COURT FOR 10 DAYS TIME AND THEN BE ENTERED UNLESS ;
SOMEONE HAS FILED OBJECTION TO RECOMMENDATION,
IN THAT
EVENT ENTRY OF RECOMMENDATION BE STAYED PENDING FURTHER ORDER
FROM JUDGE SAWAYA.
4. COMMISSIONER WILL TAKE THESE ISSUES UNDER ADVISEMENT & RE^
VIEW FILE AND REVIEW DEFT'S MOST RECENT PLEADINGS AND PLTF
ALLOWED TO FILE RESPONSIVE MEMORANDUM IN MANNER INDICATED
$
BY FEB. 7TH, 5 PM. IF DEFT UPON RECEIPT OF SUPPLEMENTAL
RESPONSES BELIEVES IT IS APPROPRIATE TO FILE SOME OTHER RESPONSE, THE DEFT NOTIFY-CLERK AND COMMISSIONER WILL NOT ISSUE RECOMMENDATION UNTIL COMMISSIONER CONDUCTS TELEPHONE
CONFERENCE WITH BOTH COUNSEL.
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FEB 0 7 1992
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247)
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Third Floor, New York Building
48 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-6996
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL a/k/a
LEE or LEA GASKILL,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF
IN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION
FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
Civil No. 764923691

v.
DON R. GASKILL,

Judge James S. Sawaya

Defendant.
ooOoo
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN, counsel of record for the above-named
Plaintiff hereby files a facsimiled copy of the AFFIDAVIT OF
PLAINTIFF IN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT.

The

original Affidavit will be filed at a later date.
DATED this _3l_ aay of February, 1992.
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN

2LEN~~E .CHRISTIAN
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF IN SUPPORT OF HER
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT by placing same in the United States
mail,

postage

prepaid,

on

this

day

of

February,

1992,

addressed to:
BRENT D. YOUNG
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Defendant
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603

Kay J. Slahtaskj
gaakill.2aff
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Third Judicial District
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247)
AUSTIN & CHRISTIAN
.
Attorney* for P l a i n t i f f
Third Floor, New York Buildino

FEB 0 7 1992
_

SAtrUAKE

COUNTY

48 Poet Office ?iace
*
—
Salt Lake City/ Utah 84101
o^c**
Telephone: (801)532-6996
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 8ALT LAK£ COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
-••---ooOoo—
ALBERTA FANNEY QAflKILL a/k/a
LEE or LEA GASXILL,
.,_.„* iff
naintifl,

,
APPIDAVIT OP PLAINTir?
• " L S U P P 0 R T 0 F H E R MOTION
, FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

:

i
v

J C 4 v 1 1 No » 764923691
! judge Jameg S . saweya
I

*
DON R. GASXILL,
Defendant.

-ooOooSTATE OF CALIFORNIA )
IBS

COUNTY OF ________

)

ALEERTA FANNEY GASXILL a/k/a LEE or LEA GASKILL, Being first
upon her oath duly sworn, deposes and states:
1.

I am the Plaintiff named in the above-entitled action,

and I have been divorced from the Defendant above-named, DON R,
GASXILL, since December 30, 1976.
2.

The Decree of Divorce awarded me alimony in the amount of

$450.00 par month which the Defendant was ordered to pay, but
Defendant has failed and refused to pay alimony as ordered.
3.

I have personal knowledge of the information contained in

thia Affidavit,
and believe that Defendant has had the financial
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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_

ability to pay alimony as he was self-employed

as a General

Contractor until his recent retirement.
4. fly the time of our divorce in 1976/ the Defendant had
moved from the State of Utah and, between 1976 and the time I
sought enforcement of the alimony award In 1578, I repeatedly asked
Defendant to provide financial assistance to me and pay the alimony
a» ordered by the Court.
5<

The action brought in 1978 was never completed

for

reasons unknown to me, and th« court dismissed the action withcut
prejudice.
.!•••

Defendant remarried in 1977 or 1978 and told me that his

new wife would not allow him to pay alimony to me.
7*

After Defendant divorced his second wife/ he contacted ma

approximately six times/ and I again asked him to pay alimony to mo
and he refused.
8.

Defendant moved to Seattle, Washington, remarried for tha

jjecond time, and several years passed without any communication
between us.
9.

Defendant told our children over the years that ha was

ttfraid to visit them in Utah because I would have him "thrown in
jail" because he had not paid me any alimony.
10.

Contrary to Defendant's assertions in his affidavit that

there were several timea we could have discussed the issue of
alimony when we were together, Defendant and 1 have never talked

2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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privately aheui^-tfco issue of aUsteny.

On one occasion to which

Defendant refers, we were both present at a family party, at our
children's request, on Christmas Eve in either 1984 or 1985, but we
did not talk privately between us.
11.

I have not addressed the issue of alimony with Defendant

when we have been together because we have always been in the
presence

of our

children,

and

X did not

feel

that

it was

appropriate to discuss this matter in their presence.
12.
our

As to Defendant's allegations that I have cohabited air.ce

divorce,

that

is

simply

untrue.

Although

I have

had

relationships with men, and I have had men spend the night in my
residence or I have spent the night in their residence, I have
never cohabited with an unrelated male, have never combined <uy
household with & man's household, nor has a man lived with ma in my
household.
13.

2 moved from the State of Utah in 1985 and have eir.ce

attempted to collect the judgment for alimony arrearages in the.
State of Washington, although Defendant seeke to have this Court
declare Judge Sawaya's Order invalid*
14.

X have suffered tremendously over the yeairs due to

Defendant's failure to pay alimony as he was ordered to do, and as
he knew he was ordered to do, and believe that I am entitled to
Judgment against him for the amounts owing to me.

3

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

onoono

th. W « t e t . hould ^
P y

com,

y att

« a » r . f « M4

FURTHER AfFIANT SAYETH NOT.
DATED ,hi. _£_

day of february(

1M2

l»M.
*<Nnrf^gQwrni •*• •

OFFICIAL SEAL
-A
LOUISE YVONNE HARP
NoToryftjb<I<>Calitomla
SOUNOCOUNFY
My Commiwlon bpircti
January 26,1994

'i

M^Commission Expires•
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CERTIFICATE OF KMIIKO
I h . r r t y certify t t a t I c a u s * t o M ««il«* • t r u e «tf = ° r r . e t
„ p y o* t h . f o r . g 0 i n 9 » « > « «

OF tUXKXrt I* IUFFOM OF HSR

MOTIOH FOR F.NTAV OF JUDGMENT by placing —
**!,

po,«,.

P r.P«id,

on t h U

_ _

1» « » u n i t -

Sft.s

<"F «« F*b™ry,

1»1.

addresied tfit
BRENT 0. YOUNG
IVIB L YOUNG
Attorney* for Defendant
48 North University Avenue
P.O. BOX 672
Prove. UT 84603

Kay J. Slahtaaky

1«kiU.«ff
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THIRD JUDiUlAL DISTRICT
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247)
-j
SALTL4HB'!CfljjilT
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Third Floor, New York Building
48 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-6996
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL a/k/a
LEE or LEA GASKILL,

AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF
IN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION
FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 764923691

DON R. GASKILL,

Judge James S. Sawaya

Defendant.
-ooOooSTATE OF CALIFORNIA )
COUNTY OF

:ss
)

ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL a/k/a LEE or LEA GASKILL, Being first
upon her oath duly sworn, deposes and states:
1.

I am the Plaintiff named in the above-entitled action,

and I have been divorced from the Defendant above-named, DON R.
GASKILL, since December 30, 1976.
2.

The Decree of Divorce awarded me alimony in the amount of

$450.00 per month which the Defendant was ordered to pay, but
Defendant has failed and refused to pay alimony as ordered.
3.

I have personal knowledge of the information contained in

this Affidavit, and believe that Defendant has had the financial
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

nf\r\r\n^

ability to pay alimony as he was self-employed

as a General

Contractor until his recent retirement.
4.

By the time of our divorce in 1976, the Defendant had

moved from the State of Utah and, between 1976 and the time I
sought enforcement of the alimony award in 1978, I repeatedly asked
Defendant to provide financial assistance to me and pay the alimony
as ordered by uhe Court.
5.

The action brought in 1978 was never completed for

reasons unknown to me, and the court dismissed the action without
prejudice.
6.

Defendant remarried in 1977 or 1978 and told me that his

new wife would not allow him to pay alimony to me.
7.

After Defendant divorced his second wife, he contacted me

approximately six times, and I again asked him to pay alimony to me
and he refused.
8.

Defendant moved to Seattle, Washington, remarried for the

second time, and several years passed without any communication
between us.
9.

Defendant told our children over the years that he was

afraid to visit them in Utah because I would have him "thrown in
jail" because he had not paid me any alimony.
10.

Contrary to Defendant's assertions in his affidavit that

there were several times we could have discussed the issue of
alimony when we were together, Defendant and I have never talked

2
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privately. On one occasion to which Defendant refers, we were both
present at a family party, at our children's request, on Christmas
Eve in either 1984 or 1985, but we did not talk privately between
us.
11.

I have not addressed the issue of alimony with Defendant

when we have been together because we have always been in the
presence

of our children, and

I did not

feel that

it was

appropriate to discuss this matter in their presence.
12.
our

As to Defendant's allegations that I have cohabited since

divorce,

that

is

simply

untrue.

Although

I have

had

relationships with men, and I have had men spend the night in my
residence or I have spent the night in their residence, I have
never cohabited with an unrelated male, have never combined my
household with a man's household, nor has a man lived with me in my
household.
13.

1 moved from the State of Utah in 1985 and have since

attempted to collect the judgment for alimony arrearages in the
State of Washington, although Defendant seeks to have this Court
declare Judge Sawaya's Order invalid.
14.

I have suffered tremendously over the years due to

Defendant's failure to pay alimony as he was ordered to do, and as
he knew he was ordered to do, and believe that I am entitled to
judgment against him for the amounts owing to me.

3
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15.

This Is the third time I have had to retain the services

of an attorney to assist me in obtaining alimony, and believe that
the Defendant

should

be ordered

to pay my attorney's

fees and

costs.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
¥

DATED this

day of February, 1992.

6^XJ

ALBERTA" F A N N E Y " G A S K I L L a/k/a
LEE OR LEAiGASKILL
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before roe this

P7

day of February,

1992.

n j " r a n c , s T. Stiles .
BNOMnv PUBLIC. C A U F O R N J

^l^^wnu^ri

tugs J

TARY PUBLIC^RSsiding in
—^
County
State of California

My Commission Expires

STATE OP CALIFORNIA
<t*yi~*'
COUNTY OF _*M*-

J ss.

On " ^ y Y a A y ^ / / V 9 2 >
befwre me, the, undersigned, a Notary Public in and for
said State,
*, farsonally appeared ^ ^
M*r*J?Jtt
,personally known to me or
proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be
the person_ whose name L* subscribed to the within
instrument and acknowledged that lJU jeiecuted the same
WITNESS my hand ^nd official seal
Signature

OFFICIAL SEAL

Francis T. Stiles
(NOTARY PUBLIC • CALIFORNIA
SOLANO COUNTY
My Comm. Expires May 2.1995
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF IN SUPPORT OF HER
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT by placing same in the United States
mail, postage

prepaid, on this c^p

M

day of February,

addressed to:
BRENT D. YOUNG
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Defendant
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603

Kay J. Slahtasky
gaakUl.aff
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HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247)
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Third Floor, New York Building
48 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-6996
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
ALBERTA FANNIE GASKILL a/k/a
LEE or LEA GASKILL,

NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS
AND FIRM AFFILIATION

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 764923691

v.

Judge James S. Sawaya

DON R. GASKILL,
Defendant.
ooOoo

TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT AND ALL COUNSEL OF RECORD:
COMES NOW, HELEN E. CHRISTIAN, formerly of GUSTIN, GREEN
STEGALL & LIAPIS, hereby gives notice that her address, telephone
number and firm affiliation, effective as of February 15, 1992 is:
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN, P.C.
Suite 722, Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7444
All notices, pleadings, papers, correspondence and other documents
should be sent to me at the firm and address shown above.
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DATED this ^-*

day of March, 1992.
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN

4s^JL

HELEN E. CHRISTIAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS AND FIRM
AFFILIATION by placing same in the United States mail, postage
prepaid, on this ^)Lr:aay of March, 1992, addressed to:
BRENT D. YOUNG
IVIE S. YOUNG
Attorneys for Defendant
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603

gaakill.chadd
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BRENT D. YOUNG (3584)
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Defendant
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84601
Telephone: 375-3000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ALBERTA FANNIE GASKILL,
aka LEE or LEA GASKILL,
RELEASE AND ORDER OF TAPES
FOR THE PURPOSE OF
Plaintiff,
OBTAINING A TRANSCRIPT OF
HEARING
v.
DON R. GASKILL,

Case No. 764923691
Commissioner Michael Evans

Defendant.
TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT:
1.

You are hereby requested to release the tape/s of the

hearing set forth below to

.

for the purpose of obtaining a transcript, to be sent to the
following upon completion:
Brent D. Young
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603
2.

This request is for a transcript of a preliminary

hearing in the above entitled case, held on January 29, 1992,
at 2:00 p.m. before Commissioner Evans.
3.

The matter was before the court for a hearing on

plaintiff's motion for entry of judgment.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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4.

Cost of the transcript will be paid by Brent D. Young.

5.

Case No. 764923691, Tape No. D23691 at Counter

Dated this

\%

day of

\i\k\/

.

, 1992.

^

BY THE COURT:
MICHAEL EVANS, Commissioner

/Uw^BRENT D. YOUNG

/

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this
7* day of May, 1992, I
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Release and
Order of Tapes for the Purpose of Obtaining a Transcript, to
the following, by placing it in the United States Mail, postage
prepaid, addressed as follows:
Helen E. Christian
Attorney at Law
Third Floor, New York Building
48.Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 ^

}

BRENT D. YOUNG
trnscrpt/formsp/c
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fchirfc Circuit Court
May 18, 1992

Penny C. Abbott
3241 South 4840 West
West Valley City, UT

Case No. 764923691
84120

Gaskill vs Gaskill

Brent D. Young has requested a transcript of tapes used for
court proceedings on January 29, 1992.
Enclosed you will find 1 original cassette tape(s),
number(s) 1-19:25-4 2:17, and a copy of the request.
Please prepare a transcript of the testimony on these tapes
and return the original tapes and transcript to Carolyn Weber Third Circuit Court Building, 451 South 200 East, Room 340,
Salt Lake City, UT 84111. Please submit billing to Brent D.
Young.
MAILING ADDRESS
Brent D. Young
Ivie & Young
Attorney for Defendant
4 8 North University Avenue
PO Box 672
Provo, UT 84601
Thank you

ZA
AngelafTfalcer

*9h

C_

Deputy Court Clerk
Salt Lake Department

1 Vp.iflllK h!
I.:V:I..M
(.tiv, ( ' I . I J . M I I I
,1)

C

H

K'4

West Valley IVpamnent

Sandy I Vpartmcnt

V . J South M.iu- St rev t

1616 South 2700 W C M

86S0S.mil. 440 C M

Muri.iy, ( J u l . M107

West ViillcyCJiiy, U i ; i h M M 9
Phone (801)533-7889

SanJ\, Utah 84070
Phonc(80l)5U-7SS*

Mmr;iy I \ | .tmik-ni

l i , . n c (801 )J(»I-0561
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BRENT D. YOUNG (3584)
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Defendant
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603
Telephone: 375-3000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, aka
LEE or LEA GASKILL,
Plaintiff,

SUPPLEMENTAL
AFFIDAVIT OF DON R.
GASKILL IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION TO MODIFY DECREE

vs.
DON R. GASKILL,

Civil.No.

D 23691

Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH
County of Utah

)
: ss.
)

DON R. GASKILL, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am the defendant in the above-entitled case.

2.

I was divorced in 1976 from Mrs. Gaskill.

3.

Since that time I was informed once of plaintiff's

claim for alimony.

This occurred in 1978 when I was served

with the documents asserting her claim for $6,000 in alimony.
4.

Fron the time I signed the Waiver, 8 September, 1976,

I have assumed and taken the position that I do not owe alimony.
5.
divorce.

I have seen Mrs. Gaskill several times since the
I saw her at our granddaughter's graduation (Heather)

in Sandy, Utah a few years ago. We visited for some time. She
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did not mention alimony.
6.

I saw her at Michelle's home at a Christmas party six

or seven years ago.
7.

She did not mention alimony.

I saw her on on several occasions at Lori's home.

She

never mentioned alimony.
8.

About one year ago I saw her in Vallejo, California.

We went to dinner with our children Dan and Kim.
for several hours that day.

We visited

She did not then and has not ever

mentioned alimony.
Dated and signed this

day of January, 1992.

DON R.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ^L / day of
January, 1992.
M2f//>Jt A jgf**^
Notary
gaskill2/2.12

;!^.f

Exp. £-23-92
-92 V*
V
WAfiGJE R0S8/NS «

1V
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JUN 1 * 1992
BRENT D. YOUNG (3584)
I VIE & YOUNG
^SALTUK^UM^
Attorneys for Defendant
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603
Telephone: 375-3000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT C IRT
ALBERTA FANNEY
aka LAKE COUNTY, STATE jF UTAH
IN GASKILL,
AND FOR SALT
LEE or LEA GASKILL,
ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION
FOR ENTRY OF
Plaintiff,
JUDGMENT
vs.
DON R. GASKILL,

Civil No.

D 23691

Defendant.
Defendant answers plaintiff Motion for Entry of Judgment
as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
Plaintiff's Motion fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
Plaintiff's claim is barred by laches, estoppel, and
waiver.
THIRD DEFENSE
Plaintiff's claim is barred by plaintiff's cohabitation
with another individual.
FOURTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff's claim >r a substantial portion of it
(78-12-22) is barred by Statute of Limitations.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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FIFTH DEFENSE
1.

Defendant admits the allegations contained in

paragraph 1.
2.

In answering paragraph 2 defendant admits the Decree

so provides but denies the validity of that portion of the
Decree.
3.

In answering paragraph 3 defendant alleges that he

made a contract to submit to jurisdiction of the Utah Court
provided no alimony would be awarded.
4.

Defendant admits the allegations contained in

paragraph 4.
5.

In answering paragraph 5 defendant denies that he owes

alimony, but alleges that if he does, it would only be from
eight (8) years from the filing of the motion which tolled the
statute of limitations.

(78-12-22 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as

amended).
Dated this £ o day of January, 1992.

BRENT D. YOUNG 0
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the
day of January, 1992, I
hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer
to Motion for Entry of Judgment, to Helen Christian, Attorney
for Plaintiff.

wr
BRENT D. YOUNC
gaskilll/2.12
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Thifd JwiiW-lal District

JUN 1 r. 1992

^Vvo^NG

(3584)

/«|g»

Attorneys for Defendant
By j, s&^-^ ^bepuiyUml
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603
Telephone: 375-3000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, aka
LEE or LEA GASKILL,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF PETITION TO MODIFY
DECREE

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No.

DON R. GASKILL,

D 23691

Defendant.
INTRODUCTION
Mrs.

Gaskill filed a foreign judgment in the state of

Washington on or about 20 August, 1991.

There she seeks to

execute on a judgment for many tens of thousands of dollars.
Mr.

Gaskill filed a petition in Utah in November of 1991

seeking an adjudication as to the validity of the Decree which
provides for alimony.

There is no judgment for delinquent

alimony in the Utah Court.

He claims the Decree is

inconsistent with the terms of the Consent and Waiver.

He also

alleges waiver, estopple and cohabitation as grounds to
terminate or to have alimony terminated.
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FACTS

1.

The defendant, Mr. Don R. Gaskill, a resident then of

California, signed a consent and waiver to appear before the
above-entitled court on 8 September, 1976.
2.

The consent "waives time within which to answer or

otherwise plead this said Complaint and consents that his
default may be entered ..."
3.

The complaint specifically dealt with all property

issues and referred to agreements between the parties in the
following particulars:
Paragraph 6: That the plaintiff and defendant have
made a physical division of all property belonging to each
other..•
Paragraph 7: That the plaintiff and defendant are in
the process of resolving debts and claims arising out of
the construction, fire and sheriff sale and subsequent
sale of redemption on property located in North Layton,
and upon the payment of outstanding bills arising
therefrom plaintiff, by agreement of plaintiff and
defendant, is to retain the proceeds as her sole and
exclusive property. (Emphasis added)
Paragraph 10: That the plaintiff and defendant
agreed that attorney fees ... (Emphasis added)
4.

The consent and waiver has handwritten in Mr.

Gaskill's handwriting "Omit #8 on Complaint".

(Affidavit of

Don Gaskill, dated 30 December, 1991).
5.

A Judgment and Decree was entered on 30 December
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1976.

The Decree provided the provision in paragraph 8 which

awarded alimony.
6.

On 6 October, 1978, the plaintiff, Mrs. Gaskill, filed

a motion for order to show cause seeking $6,000 as a judgment
against Mr. Gaskill for delinquent alimony.
7.

On October 31, 1978, Mr. Gaskill responded and

contended that he wrote "omit para. 8 on Complaint".

He

claimed the Decree should be set aside as provided by Rule
60(b)(7).

Mr. Gaskill also raised the issue of subject matter

jurisdiction.

(Affidavit of Don Gaskill dated 23 October,

1978, paragraphs 6 and 7).
8.

Mr. Gaskillfs affidavit was denominated "Affidavit in

Support of Motion to Amend Decree of Divorce."
9.

The matter was scheduled to be heard on 21 November

1978 at 3:30.
10.

The file does not show a response to Mr. Gaskill!s

"Affidavit in Support of Motion to Amend Decree of Divorce."
11.

The court dismissed Mrs. Gaskillfs Petition on July

2, 1979 stating "Neither party having filed the memorandua
ordered by the court, the petition is dismissed without
prejudice."
12.

On August 19, 1991, more than 12 1/2 years later,

Mrs. Gaskill filed in Superior Court of Washington County,
State of Washington, claiming delinquent alimony.
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ARGUMENT
The facts relied upon for this memorandum set forth above
are undisputed and come from the record.

Mr. Gaskill in his

petition asks the court to make a determination as to the
validity of the decree insofar as it provides for alimony.

In

this regard he raises the issue of whether Mrs. Gaskill has
waived her claim for alimony, whether she should be estopped
from claiming alimony, whether the decree should be modified
nunc pro tunc such that it is consistent with the consent and
waiver, and whether she is barred because of cohabitation from
asserting the claim for alimony.

If it becomes necessary to

treat this last issue, an evidenciary hearing hearing will be
necessary.

WAIVER
The elements of waiver were recently addressed in the case
of Hinckley v. Hinckley, 167 Utah Adv. Rep 16.

There the court

said at page 17, citing Mont Trucking v. Entrada Indus., 802
P.2d 779, (Utah App. 1990) (quoting Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d
1226, 1230 (Utah App. 1988):

Waiver is "the intentional relinquishment of a known
right." In order for waiver to occur, "there must be an
existing right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its
existence, and an intention to relinquish it." "The
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party's actions or conduct must evidence unequivocally an
intent to waive, or must be inconsistent with any other
intent.'1 "Whether a right has been waived is generally a
question of *ct and therefore we accord considerable
deference to the finder of fact's determination."
For the purpose of this analysis it is required to assume
the right of alimony exists. While in BO assuming for the
purpose of argument, this defendant denies Mr. Gaskill's right
to alimony does exist.
It is absolutely clear that Mrs. Gaskill believed she had
a right to claim alimony.

In her affidavit dated 6 April,

1978, she made that claim.
It is also absolutely clear that her actions and conduct
evidence unequivocally an intent to waive that claim.
conduct is inconsistent with any other intent.

Her

Mrs. Gaskill

retained an attorney, filed a petition and sought delinquent
alimony in 1978.

She knew, as the record shows, that Mr.

Gaskill claimed he was not obligated to pay alimony.
there was a hearing on that subject.

She knew

She knew she had the

obligation of pursuing her claim for alimony.

She did not

reply to Mr. Gaskill's affidavit in 1978 in which he claimed he
was not obligated to pay alimony.
court directive to go forward.
Her claim was dismissed.

She did not comply with the

It was her burden to do so.

She did nothing about this claim for

13 1/2 (thirteen and one-half) years.

Her condi

for 13 1/2

years is completely consistent with an intent to waive
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alimony.

It is totally inconsistent with any other intent.
NUNC PRO TUNC

Title 30-4a-l of the Utah Code, 1953 as amended, provides:
A court having jurisdiction may, upon its finding of
good cause and giving of such notice as may be ordered,
enter an order nunc pro tunc in a matter relating to
marriage, divorce, legal separation or annulment of
marriage, (Emphasis added)
This section of the Code has been addressed by the Utah
Court of Appeals, Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057 (Utah App,
1990) and the Utah Supreme Court, Home v. Home, 737 P.2d 244
(Utah 1987).

Both cases are helpful.

In the Bagshaw case Mr. Bagshaw alleged that the parties
and their attorneys made an oral agreement to terminate
alimony.

Mrs. Bagshaw denied that allegation.

Mr. Bagshaw

subsequently sought to enforce the oral agreement.

The trial

court found there was to be "no termination of alimony by
reason of the actions of the plaintiff."

(Mrs. Bagshaw).

The

court concluded there was no good cause.

The court explained

at page 1060 and following:
The Home court held section 30-4a-l eliminated the
common law nunc pro tunc requirement of a
previously-entered final order and concluded that all that
is required under the statute is a finding of "good
cause." Id. The court stated that "[t]he meaning of
'good cause1 must be determined on a case by case basis,
in light of all of the surrounding circumstances, as
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equity and justice require." Id. at 248-49.
While section 30-4a-l has a broad remedial scope, it
does not abrogate all the common law trappings of nunc pro
tunc law. At common law, nunc pro tunc allowed a court to
correct its earlier error or supply its omission so the
record accurately reflected that which in fact had taken
place. Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298, 299 (Utah 1984);
Home, 737 P.2d at 246. Cases in which courts
traditionally have applied the nunc pro tunc doctrine fall
into two categories:
(1) those in which one of the parties died after
the submission of the case to the lower court for its
decision, but before the actual rendition of
judgment; and (2) those in which a judgment has in
fact been rendered by the lower court, but the clerk
has failed to perform the ministerial function of
entry..
6A J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, paragraph 58.08
(1989).
The second category is based upon the principle that
"where the delay in rendering judgment or decree arises
from the act of the court, that is, where the delay has
been for its convenience, or has been caused by the
multiplicity or press of business or the intricacy of the
questions involved, or of any other cause not attributable
to the laches of the parties, but within the control of
the court; the judgment or the decree may be entered
retrospectively...." Mitchell v. Overman, 103 U.S. 62,
64-65, 26 L.Ed. 369 (1881) (emphasis added); see also 6A
J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice paragraph 58.08 (1989).
These general principles of the common law of nunc pro
tunc are relevant, if not controlling, in a determination
of good cause under section 30-4a-l. In this case, the
court did not make the clerical error, but taking the
facts in the light most favorable to the Husband, Husband
did. It is undisputed that the court never received the
written stipulation mentioned in the minute entry. Thus,
this alone could support a finding of lack of "good cause"
under section 30-4a-l.
Furthermore, a nunc pro tunc order must, even under the
more liberal requirements of section 30-4a-l, still be
entered for the purpose of making the record reflect what

7
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actually was meant to happen at a prior time. Thus, in
determining good cause in our case, the threshold inquiry
is (1) did Husband and Wife clearly agree that alimony
would be terminated in 1973, and (2) was the court
prepared in 1973 to enter an order based upon that
agreement? The court found that "[t]he parties did not
enter into any enforceable stipulation to modify the
decree of divorce to terminate alimony by the defendant to
the plaintiff," andff[t]here was no termination of alimony
by reason of the actions of the plaintiff," Again, the
court's findings support a conclusion that the "good
cause" required for the entry of an order nunc pro tunc
under section 30-4a-l was not present.
There is good cause to modify the decree.

Mr. Gaskill, a

resident of California at the time, contracted to submit
himself to the jurisdiction of the Utah Court and to have the
court divide the assets, provided that he not be required to
pay alimony.

Because the alimony provision was included by the

court, contrary to the express terms of the consent, the decree
should be modified to provide now, as should have then, ie no
alimony*

ESTOPPLE
The case of Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057 (Utah App.
1990) is helpful.
estoppel.

It lays out, at page 1061, the elements of

There the court said:

In order to prevail on his theory of estoppel,
plaintiff must prove that defendant, by her
representations or actions led plaintiff to believe he
need not pay alimony or child support, and that plaintiff,
in reliance on said representations, changed his position
to his detriment. In such a case, enforcement of the
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decree creates a hardship and injustice to plaintiff, and
defendant would be estopped to deny her own
misrepresentations, and estopped from claiming unpaid
support.
Mrs. Gaskill filed an affidavit seeking delinquent alimony
in April, 1978•

Since that date she has done nothing.

actions are clear.

Her

Her claim, which she had the burden

pursuing, was abandoned.

Mr. Gaskill went on with his life

until August of 1991 when he was confronted with a claim for
many tens of thousands of dollars.

Clearly, to award such a

claim against him would create an undue hardship and an
injustice.

COHABITATION
The claim of cohabitation cannot be resolved by this
memorandum.

In the event the court rules in favor of Mrs.

Gaskill on the other issues, then an evidentiary hearing will
be required to determine if she has cohabited with someone else.
Dated and signed this

day of January, 1992.

Respectfully submitted,

BRENT D. YOUNG
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that on the ^ f

day of January, 1992, I

hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Memorandum in Support of Petition to Modify Decree, to Helen
Christian, Attorney for Plaintiff*

<U4*tWljt>A
BRENT D. YOUNC

gaskill/2.12/3
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH £?

ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff, j

Case No. 76492?691 DA
COMMISSIONER: >f* ?:

\

vs.

MICHAEL S.5EVANS '

DON R. GASKILL,

..»••;

Defendant.
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This matter comes on for hearing- pursuantf to [defendant's
Motion for an Order to Show Cause and Petition to-Modify the
Decree of Divorce and plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment•
At hearing before the Commissioner, Counsel stipulated that the
disputed issues are issues at law and that the Commissioner
- *\

could address the issues identified following the submission of
further memorandum
that

discovery

Commissioner's

from

could

Counsel*

Counsel

continue

recommendation

beyond

and that

further

stipulated

the ^ date >: of :? the
entryr ofy an") order

resulting from the Commissioner's recommendation be stayed for
ten (10) days or such further time period in ,,the event of a
timely objection,

_

\

; ;v«£
,;'••'•'

„J.

'••''1''

."

•.'•'*

Counsel stipulate to—submit the following questions of law
-

-

.

*

:

•'.•••.-.•

' • • • •

: •
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GASKILL V.' GASKILL
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for t h e Commissioner's recommendation:

'

'.;•: '.
Whether the Decree of Divorce is valid;

|

•n

^

^

Whether the Decree of Divorce should be modified or amended
nunc pro tunc;

^

0 f;.•••.

f

Whether plaintiff's claim for judgment is barred or limited
because of waiver, estoppel or statute of limitations;

5,

Whether plaintiff's claim for alimony is barred by way of
operation of law as a result of her alleged cohabitation; and |
Whether judgment should enter in favor of plaintiff and, if
so, for what time period.

r-<v

$

^

The undisputed facts reveal that the parties together have
created a most perplexing circumstance.
years

of marriage

plaintiff

was

and the rearing

awarded

a

Decree

Following twenty (25)

of four. (4)t children,
of

Divorce

pursuant

to

defendant's default based upon a "Consent and Waiver" to which
defendant had interlineated "omit number 8 on complaint."
Paragraph

8 of plaintiff's

complaint

provides

"that the

defendant pay the plaintiff $700.00 per month alimony for a
period of thirty (30) months, after which time the defendant has
agreed to pay the plaintiff $450.00 per month for the reaminder
of her life, providing, however, that should plaintiff remarry
all alimony payments shall cease forthwith."
At hearing

on plaintiff's

complaint,

the Court's

Minute

Entry reflects "Divorce-granted to plaintiff as prayed, except
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GASKILL V, GASKILL
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plaintiff is awarded $450.00 per month alimony." %

§

In October, 1978, plaintiff brought her Order to Show Cause
seeking a judgment for unpaid alimony.

The Court's Minute Entry

reflects that hearing on plaintiff's Order to Show Cause was
continued at the request of defendant's Counsel,^ Defendant then
filed his Motion to Amend Decree of Divorce seeking nunc pro
tunc amendment

awarding no alimony*

Following

argument, the

• V

." . 1 *

••••

Court directed both counsel to submit memoranda,T When none were
received, the Court ruled by way of Minute Entry that "The
Petition

is

denied

without

prejudice."

The

Commissioner

clarifies the Court's Minute Entry in this regard to indicate
that

both

plaintiff's

Order

to

Show

Cause

was

denied

defendant's Motion to Amend was dismissed without prejudice,

and
£

Neither party took any further legal action ; ,arding these
issues until recently when plaintiff sought entry of a judgment
for failure to pay alimony in the State of Washington' where
defendant presently resides.
has paid no alimony.

It is undisputed"that defendant

The parties dispute whether plaintiff has

requested payments directly from the defendant.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS:

•*

Plaintiff's claim for judgment^ for alimony due, ~ ?ing but
unpaid is limited pursuant to U.C.A. 78-12-22 to reco\

^ng only

those sums due, owing but unpaid accruing eight ^(8) years prior
to plaintiff's motion ^to-enforce the Decree seeking judgment.
J*
-?v.

-

i

V;

;
'Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J..Reuben
• Clark Law
'y School, BYU.
:V-[<.**'
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WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL:
Both

parties

I

claim

the other

should

be. estopped

from

• ,i{/%

asserting his or her position as a result of failure! to resolve r %^'J
the actions initiated

in October, 1978 and failure* to pursue
3

said positions at any point subsequent to 1978/ and both parties
assert that same circumstance result in the others' waiving any
claim

for relief.

In not pursuing

her claim

for relief/

plaintiff ran the risk that her recovery would be limited, as it
has

been,

by

limitations.

operation

of

the

applicable

statute

of

Conversly, defendant's awareness of a prima facia

valid order of the Court requiring his payment/of alimony and
his failure to prosecute his Motion to Amend said Decree created
the

risk

defendant.

that

the order

would

be

enforced

against

the

Of the two, defendant had at least equal incentive

to prosecute to completion the relief he sought in his 1978
pleading.

Under

the present

circumstances,

it ^ would

be

inequitable to find that either party is estopped from asserting
their respective positions or that they have waived the same, '*
VALIDITY OF DECREE:

}

y ;*J.

^ i

?

While it is clear there was no complete meeting of the minds
reflected by the Consent and Waiver.defendant returned and which
was

the basis

of entering

defendant's

default

and awarding

plaintiff a Decree of Divorce, is equally clear that defendant's
failure to prosecute his-Motion to Amend filed in 1978 deprived
.

\y/$

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.3

; /.

'^- §

I 000090

*

•

•

•

• •

•'* $•;

GASKILL V/ GASKILL

V * "'

^f PAGE 5f ? ^"^p!NUTEfpNTRY^ ^

the Court of any reasonable opportunity to set aside the initial
*

h -

-••'

~

-

'•

$&

-

i

:'

alimony award and to take evidence as to what, .if any/ alimony
'I;
award would be appropriate.
It would be diffi ult, if not ~ ' ';'
impossible, to actually determine an appropriate

nony

-i

ward

in light of the parties circumstances in 1976, ; In this r<~~jard#
the Commissioner

notes that

at the time

of ~t:he -divorce

V;

the

r ;

parties had been married for twenty-five (25) years/|had reared
-

• ' • & $ • •

•,:"..-

••.;

'

- ^

> .

• *

four (4) children and there appeared to a substantial disparity > :• /
in the part es income, a! of which factors are consistent with
an award of permanent al

*' *;

)ny in a substantial/amount, /It sis

:

not necessary to decide wrather defendant should be ^entitled to ?, -v>*
relief

from operation of the Decree of Divorce

in/regard to

alimony between the time of it's entry in 1976 and the time
defendant became aware of the order as plaintiff's ability to
recover is limited to the eight (8) year period preceeding the
initiation of her action to recover*
COHABITATION:
Defendant

argues

that

Decree in 1976/ plaintiff

at some

point

cohabitated

since

such

cohabitatior

the entry of

in a fashion so as to

allow the Court to terminate the alimony award.
denies

%
>

;^ •/
/*•/< ;

The Commissioner

The plaintiff

agrees

with the

position as set forth in plaintiff's Memorandum and recommends
that

the alimony

award

not be terminated /as a ^ r e s u l t

plaintiff's alleged cohabitation.
'
:
»

. '

... ?

-

':-...-

• > f
;

•

—

:
'•

'
.

.^

• • • '
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-

' • £

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
*
'''.'. contain
••' errors.
.'• ;'
••• ' * :
Machine-generated OCR, may

r-

'

••:• :-.:-- %

%

^

7-

.":•

.-•

/ ?

;

of
;

V:

:.

*
r

:

I

V*

I

finAAm

'
-'

\
'? '"

.«
•4

GASKILL V. GASKILL

V"" "

%

tfpAGE'isf' ^!: ^ B S n T O T f ^ T R V
^
*

MODIFICATION:
|
Defendant seeks, in the alternative, an order modifying the
Decree

of Divorce

terminating

alimony to plaintiff.

defendant's

obligation to pay
• * -$s v .. . ,;
In this regard defendant has failed to

allege, and the Commissioner cannot find, a substantial change
of circumstances has occured material to the issue of alimony.
Consequently, the Commissioner recommends the Decree ; of Divorce
not be modified.

\;

•''£; /

RECOMMENDATION:

&

. '-£: '':

>

1.

.;

*

'

• • • *

;

••

^
•

,

.

'

Defendant's Motion to Amend Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro

Tunc, or in the Alternative, to Modify the Decree of Divorce be
denied.
2.

\
Plaintiff

l[\
be awarded judgment

% % ";;. .. v:
againstl defendant for
.

•

%

'

; - : # • •

alimony due, owing but unpaid in the sum of $450.00 per month
for the time period commencing eight (8) years next r preceeding
the filing of plaintiff's Motion for Judgment and continuing to
the present time.
3.

Implementation of the Commissioner's Recommendation be

stayed for a period of ten (10) days, or longer in the event of
;A
"X- 'r '"••-" f
filing of a timely objection.
*£
~?
4.

Plaintiff's Counsel is to prepare an order, consistent
' %

with this recommendation.
DATED this

day of June, 1992.

MICHAEL S. EVANS
DISTRICT COURT CO
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CERTIFICATE OF HAILING
I hereby

certify

that

I mailed

a tr

and

correct^ copy

pf

«-;

the
this

foregoing

i^

MINUTE

ENTRY,

postage prepaid,

to the/* following,
ft

day of June, 1992:

I
H

Helen E, Christian
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN
Attorney for Plaintiff
Third Floor, New York Building
48 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
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DISTRICT COURT

JMtt

8 IMAM'S?

BRENT D. YOUNG (3584)
rHiiil~. „.. ..,,, „
48
North
University Avenue
IVIE
& YOUNG
^^r^DEPUTY
E / o S C,LECliTF
P.O. Box 672
Attorneys
for Defendant
|y ^ ^ *
Provo, UT 84603
Telephone: 375-3000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL,
OBJECTION TO RECOMMENDATION
AND REQUEST FOR HEARING
BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT

vs.

Case No. 764923691 DA
Commissioner: Michael S. Evans

DON R. GASKILL,
Defendant.

The defendant objects to the Commissioner Recommendation,
paragraphs 1 and 2 (Page 6).

Defendant's objection

incorporates his Memorandum which was earlier filed.

It is the

defendant's position, that in addition to the arguments set
forth in his Memorandum, that the burden to pursue the alimony
claim was on the plaintiff, and not upon the defendant as the
Commissioner's decision implies.

It is the defendant's

position that the plaintiff knew in 1978 of the defendant's
objection to the alimony award, that he resisted at that time
her claim for alimony, and that the plaintiff did nothing until
she recently sought to obtain a judgment in a foreign
jurisdiction.
Defendant requests hearing of this matter in the District
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fmnna/t

Court.
Dated and signed this / ' day of June, 1992.

BRENT D. YOUNG
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this /f
day of June, 1992, I
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Objection to
Commissioner's Recommendation, to Helen Christian, Attorney for
Plaintiff, by placing it in the United States Mail, postage
prepaid, addressed as follows:
Helen Christian
Attorney at Law
Third Floor, New York Building
48 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, UT
84101

AlL^T/^/*
/&<+rZ'

JJtfG
BRENT D . YOU)
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County of Salt Lake - State of Utah

TITLE:

(*> PARTIES PRESENT)

COUNSEL:

(•* COUNSEL PRESENT)
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REPORTER
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FILED
DISTRICT COURT

HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247)
/ i p . ^ '; v A ^ / J W
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN
L^^&J&teAUilH
/)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
.._
BY
Suite 722 Boston Building
' u'..i'un CLERK
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone; (801) 531-7444
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT O F SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
ALBERTA FANNIE GASKILL a/k/a
LEE or LEA GASKILL,

\

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN
OPPOSITION T O DEFENDANT'S
OBJECTION

Plaintiff,

Civil No. 764923691

v.

Judge James S. Sawaya

DON R. GASKILL,
Defendant.
ooOoo

Plaintiff, LEA GASKILL, by and through her attorney of record,
Helen E . Christian, hereby files this response in opposition t o
Defendant's Objection to the Recommendation of the Commissioner and
asks the Court to affirm the Recommendation in all its particulars.
Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Objection is based upon
the following grounds and for the following reasons:
Defendant incorrectly asserts -hat it was Plaintiff's burden
to pursue her right to alimony, and not his burden t o correct an
Order of this Court that he now claims should n o t have been
entered. Defendant's argument fails for two reasons: In the first
place, Defendant was aware of his obligation to p a y alimony, as
this matter had been brought before the Court subsequent t o entry
i
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of the Decree, and he failed to take whatever legal action was
necessary to rectify what he now alleges was an improperly entered
Order,

Therefore, Defendant is estopped from asking for relief

from that obligation. Second, Defendants failure to pay alimony to
Plaintiff prohibited Plaintiff from obtaining the legal services
required to collect the alimony owing to her. Defendant failed to
pay alimony to Plaintiff for years and now claims that because she
did not pursue him to collect arrearages, she should not be
entitled to judgment for the arrearages owing.
would

penalize

Plaintiff

for circumstances

Such a conclusion
Defendant

himself

created and would be unreasonable and unfair.
Defendant's defenses to his failure to pay alimony and the
Court's reasons for disallowing them were sufficiently addressed in
the Commissioner's Memorandum Decision, a copy of which is attached
to this Response and incorporated herein by reference. Counsel for
the Defendant filed numerous pleadings and presented oral arguments
before the Commissioner. The Commissioner allowed counsel for both
parties to submit additional Information prior to making his
determination on the merits of their motions.
No additional information would be presented to the Court at
a

hearing

on

this

matter,

other

than

that

which

has

been

introduced, and Plaintiff respectfully represents to the Court that
she cannot afford to incur further expense for another hearing in
order to obtain Defendant's compliance with his alimony obligation.

2
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court to affirm the
recommendations of the Commissioner.
DATED this [

z

day of July, 1992.
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN

HELEN E. CHRISTIAN^
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct
copy of the

foregoing PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE

IN OPPOSITION TO

DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION, by placing same in the United States mail,
postage prepaid, on this

^' day of July, 1992, addressed to:

BRENT D. YOUNG
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Defendant
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603
- %

Kay J. Srahtasky

gaakill.2rea
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,

Case No. 764923691 DA

vs.

COMMISSIONER:

DON R. GASKILL,

MICHAEL S. EVANS

Defendant.

This matter comes on for hearing pursuant to defendants
Motion for an Order to Show Cause and Petition to Modify the
Decree of Divorce and plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Judgment.
At hearing before the Commissioner, Counsel stipulated that the
disputed

issues are issues at law and that the Commissioner

could address the issues identified following the submission of
further
that

memorandum

discovery

Commissioners

from

could

Counsel.
continue

recommendation

and

Counsel

further

beyond

the

date

that

entry

of

stipulated
of
an

the
order

resulting from the Commissioners recommendation be stayed for
ten

(10) days or such further time period in the event of a

timely objection.
Counsel stipulate to submit the following questions of law
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GASKILL V. GASKILL

PAGE 2

MINUTE ENTRY

for the Commissioner's recommendation:
Whether the Decree of Divorce is valid;
Whether the Decree of Divorce should be modified or amended
nunc pro tunc;
Whether plaintiff's claim for judgment is barred or limited
because of waiver, estoppel or statute of limitations;
Whether plaintiff's claim for alimony is barred by way of
operation of law as a result of her alleged cohabitation; and
Whether judgment should enter in favor of plaintiff and, if
so, for what time period.
The undisputed facts reveal that the parties together have
created a most perplexing circumstance.
years

of

plaintiff

marriage
was

and

awarded

the
a

rearing
Decree

Following twenty (25}

of
of

four

(4)

Divorce

children,

pursuant

to

defendant's default based upon a "Consent and Waiver11 to which
defendant had interlineated "omit number 8 on complaint."
Paragraph

8 of

plaintiff's

defendant pay the plaintiff

complaint

provides

"that

the

$700.00 per month alimony for a

period of thirty (30) months, after which time the defendant has
agreed to pay the plaintiff $450.00 per month for the reaminder
of her life, providing, however, that should plaintiff remarry
all alimony payments shall cease forthwith."
At

heai ng

on plaintiff's

complaint,

the

Court's

Minute

Entry reflects "Divorce granted to plaintiff as prayed, except
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PAGE 3

MINUTE ENTRY •

plaintiff is awarded $450.00 per month alimony."
In October, 1978, plaintiff brought her Order to Show Cause
seeking a judgment for unpaid alimony.

The Court's Minute Entry

reflects that hearing on plaintiff's Order to Show Cause was
continued at the request of defendant's Counsel.

Defendant then

filed his Motion to Amend Decree of Divorce seeking nunc pro
tunc amendment

awarding

no alimony.

Following

Court directed both counsel to submit memoranda.

argument, the
When none were

received, the Court ruled by way of Minute Entry that "The
Petition

is

denied

without

prejudice."

The

Commissioner

clarifies the Court's Minute Entry in this regard to indicate
that

both

plaintiff's

Order

to

Show

Cause

was

denied

and

defendant's Motion to Amend was dismissed without prejudice.
Neither party took any further legal action regarding these
issues until recently when plaintiff sought entry of a judgment
for failure to pay alimony in the State of Washington where
defendant presently resides.
has paid no alimony.

It is undisputed that defendant

The parties dispute whether plaintiff has

requested payments directly from the defendant.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS:
Plaintiff's claim for judgment for alimony due# owing but
unpaid is limited pursuant to U.C.A. 78-12-22 to recovering only
those sums due, owing but unpaid accruing eight (8) years prior
to plaintiff's motion ^ o

enforce the Decree seeking judgment.
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GASKILL V, GASKILL

MINUTE ENTRY

WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL:
Both

parties

claim

the

other

should

be

estopped

from

asserting his or her position as a result of failure to resolve
•the actions initiated in October, 1978 and failure to pursue
said positions at any point subsequent to 1978, and both parties
assert that same circumstance result in the others' waiving any
claim

for

relief.

In

not

pursuing

her

claim

for

relief,

plaintiff ran the risk that her recovery would be limited, as it
has

been,

by

limitations.

operation

of

the u applicable

statute

of

Conversly, defendant's awareness of a prima facia

valid order of the Court requiring his payment of alimony and
his failure to prosecute his Motion to Amend said Decree created
the

risk

that

defendant.

the

order

would

be

enforced

against

the

Of the two, defendant had at least equal incentive

to prosecute to completion the relief he sought in his 1978
pleading.

Under

the

present

circumstances,

it

would

be

inequitable to find that either party is estopped from asserting
their respective positions or that they have waived the same.
VALIDITY OF DECREE:
While it is clear there was no complete meeting of the minds
reflected by the Consent and Waiver defendant returned and which
was

the

basis

of

entering

defendant's

default

and

awarding

plaintiff a Decree of Divorce, is equally clear that defendant's
failure to prosecute his Motion to Amend filed in 1978 deprived
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PAGE 5

MINUTE ENTRY

the Court of any reasonable opportunity to set aside the initial
alimony award and to take evidence as to what, if any, alimony
award

would

be appropriate.

It would

be difficult,

if not

impossible, to actually determine an appropriate alimony award
in light of the parties circumstances in 1976.
the Commissioner

In this regard,

notes that at the time of the divorce the

parties had been married for twenty-five (25) years, had reared
four (4) children and there appeared to a substantial disparity
in the parties income, all of which factors are consistent with
an award of permanent alimony in a substantial amount.

It is

not necessary to decide whether defendant should be entitled to
relief from operation of the Decree of Divorce in regard to
alimony between the time of it's entry in 1976 and the time
defendant became aware of the order as plaintiff's ability to
recover is limited to the eight (8) year period preceeding the
initiation of her action to recover.
COHABITATION;
Defendant

argues that

at some point

Decree in 1976, plaintiff cohabitated

since the entry of

in a fashion so as to

allow the Court to terminate the alimony award.
denies

such

cohabitation.

The Commissioner

The plaintiff'

agrees with

the

position as set forth in plaintiff's Memorandum and recommends
that

the

alimony

award

not

be

terminated

plaintiff's alleged cohabitation.
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GASKILL V. GASKILL

PAGE 6

MINUTE ENTRY

MODIFICATION:
Defendant seeks, in the alternative, an order modifying the
Decree

of

Divorce

terminating

alimony to plaintiff.

defendant's

obligation

to pay

In this regard defendant has failed to

allege, and the Commissioner cannot find, a substant

change

of circumstances has occured material to the issue o. alimony.
Consequently, the Commissioner recommends th

Decree of Divorce

not be modified.
RECOMMENDATION:
1.

D^,

dant's Motion to Amend Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro

Tunc, or in the Alternative, to Modify the Decree of Divorce be
denied.
2.

Plaintiff

be

awarded

judgment

against

defendant

for

alimony due, owing but unpaid in the sum of $450.00 per month
for the t

e perio 1 commencing eight (8) years next preceeding

the filing

f pla

tiff's Motion for Judgment and continuing to

the present time.
3.

Implementation of the Commissioner's Recommendation be

stayed for a period of ten (10) days, or longer in the event of
filing of a timely objection.
4.

Plaintiff's Counsel is to prepare an order consistent

with this recommendation.
DATED this

day of June, 1992.
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MINUTE ENTRY

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing MINUTE ENTRY, postage prepaid, to the following,
this

/JJ-

day of June, 1992:

Helen E. Christian
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN
Attorney for Plaintiff
Third Floor, New York Building
48 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Brent D. Young
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorney for Defendant
P. O. Box 672
Provo, Utah 84603
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JUL I 4 54 PH '»
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247)
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Suite 722 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7444
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
ALBERTA FANNIE GASKILL a/k/a
LEE or LEA GASKILL,

NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR
DECISION AND REQUEST
FOR RULING

Plaintiff,

Civil No. 764923691

v.

Judge James S. Sawaya

DON R. GASKILL,
Defendant.
ooOoo

Plaintiff, LEA GASKILL, by and through her attorney of record,
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN, pursuant to Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial
Administration,

respectfully requests a ruling on Defendant's

Objection to Recommendation which was filed on or about June 17,
1992.

Plaintiff hereby certifies that the time allowed by the

rules for the filing of memoranda in support and/or in opposition
to the Motion has passed.
DATED this

y"

day of July, 1992.
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN

HELEN E. CHRISTIAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION AND
REQUEST FOR RULING by placing same in the United States mail,
postage prepaid, on this J _^ d a Y

of

July/ 1992, addressed to:

BRENT D. YOUNG
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorney3 for Defendant
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603

Kay J. Slaht'asky
gaskill.nsub

2
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F1L£D
DlSTRlCf COURT

BRENT D. YOUNG (3584)
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Plaintiff
48 North University Avenue

x l A
DU •QV
JUL L H 58 IH j£
nmTRid
SMV'UV'--' COUNTY

P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603

BY J ^

"
ofpUTY CLERK

Telephone: 375-3000
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
\

ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL,
CERTIFICATE OF
READINESS FOR TRIAL
Plaintiff,
vs.
DON R. GASKILL,
Defendant.

Civil No. 764923691
Commissioner Evans

It is hereby requested that the above-entitled case be set for
(check on^f:
y
' NONJURY TRIAL
JURY TRIAL, for which the jury fee of $
is enclosed
herewith.
Copies of this request have been furnished to the following:
Helen E. Christian
Attorney at Law
Third Floor, New York Building
48 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Within the purview of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, and Rule 4.1, Rules of Practice in the District
Courts, the undersigned certifies that the case is at issue and
ready for trial.
Dated: June ^ y , 1992. ^->
BRENT D . YCJUN^f
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In the District Court of the Third Judicial District
In and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL
Plaintiff

vs.

\

Notice of Pre-Trial
Settlement Hearing

DON R GASKILL

|
civil No.
Defendant
The court has set a pre-trial settlement hearing on this case as follows:
SHtfge:

COm MICHAEL S EVANS

Date:

August 11. 1992

Time:

10:00 am

764923691

C i r c u i t Courtroom 340
Counsel as well as both clients are to be present so that if settlement is reached, the divorce may be granted at this hearing.
If the domestic calendar clerk has not heard from you within five (5) days from the date of this notice, this hearing date
will be considered firm; and upon failure to appear, default will be entered.
Counsel are required to submit to the domestic calendar clerk a written settlement proposal Ave (5) days prior to the
pre-trial settlement hearing and to opposing counsel.
The Financial Declaration forms for both plaintiff and defendant must be filed with the domestic calendar clerk at
least five (5) days prior to pre-trial settlement hearing. Failure of counsel to supply the required financial information
may result in the matter being stricken. If only one party responds, then that party's statement will be deemed as true, and
the court may enter its order accordingly.
In the event a matter is stricken, the court will notify both counsel and their clients as to the reasons therefor.
If settlement is reached prior to hearing, then the court at the time of the pre-trial settlement hearing may grant the
divorce requested on a proper showing as though a default matter.
Both counsel are required to follow Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in providing the address of their clients to the
court and to each other at the time of the filing of Complaint; and if not done so, on receipt of this document.
Copies of this notice were mailed to the following attorneys and/or parties at the addresses indicated:
BRENT D YOUNG, 48 N University Ave, PO BOX 672, Provo, Ut

84603

HELEN E CHRISTIAN, //3rd Fl-N Y BLDG, 48 Post Office PI, SLC, UT 841C

Dated this

6£h

day of

J"lv

19 92

\ J U i f t j A Vffl/vA,

District Judge
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IN T H E THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT v
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE O F UTAH
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MINUTE ENTRY %
GASKILL, ALBERTA FANNEY
PLAINTIFF
VS
GASKILL, DON R

CASE NUMBER 764923691 D A
DATE 0 7 / 2 0 / 9 2 r
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK S T H v'

DEFENDANT
TYPE O F HEARING:
PRESENT:
• / • • • • - •

P.
D.

ATTY.
ATTY.
*

i

PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST F O R RULING HAVING BEEN SUBMITTED T O T H E
COURT PURSUANT T O RULE 4-501.
JOMES N O W T H E COURT A N D STATES A S
FOLLOWS: COMMISSIONER'S RECOMMENDATIONS A R E AFFIRMED - N O ORAL
ARGUMENT NECESSARY.
V :
CC: HELEN E. CHRISTIAN
"
A ,W'
"
BRENT D . YOUNG
•". %
^
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HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247)
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Suite 722 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7444

#

,J/:

W>

J <?,*
#'d

^ 0 6 1 t 1992
I'liiity Olork

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
ALBERTA FANNIE GASKILL a/k/a
LEE or LEA GASKILL,

NOTICE OF CONTINUANCE OF
PRE-TRIAL SETTLEMENT
CONFERENCE WITHOUT DATE

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 764923691
Judge James S. Sawaya

DON R. GASKILL,
Defendant.

-ooOooTO:

Defendant, DON R. GASKILL, and his attorney of record,
BRENT D. YOUNG.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the PRE-TRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE

originally scheduled

for August

11, 1992, has been continued

without date as agreed upon by both counsels of record.
DATED this

day of August, 1992.
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN

HELEN E. CHRISTIAN
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF CONTINUANCE OF PRE-TRIAL SETTLEMENT
CONFERENCE WITHOUT DATE, by placing same in the United States mail#
postage prepaid, on t h i s ^ n \ day of August, 1992, addressed to:
BRENT D. YOUNG
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Defendant
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603

gaskill.ncon

2
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J^aiEiENiT

KU$ BURBOT ftmivr
Third Judicial District

AUG 2 8 1992

HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247)
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Suite 722 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7444

LTLAKt COUNTY
SALTLAKeC
DtiAiiy ClOiK

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
OOOOO

ALBERTA FANNIE GASKILL a/k/a
LEE or LEA GASKILL,

—

ORDER

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 764923691

v.

Judge James S. Sawaya

DON R. GASKILL,
Defendant.
ooOoo

This matter having come before the Court on Defendant's
Objection to the Recommendations of Commissioner Evans entered in
his Memorandum Decision dated June 16, 1992, and the court having
reviewed the file and the pleadings contained therein, and the
court having denied Defendant's request for hearing and Plaintiff
having submitted a Request for Ruling, pursuant to Rule 4-502, Utah
Code of Judicial Administration, and the Court having entered its
Minute Entry dated July 20, 1992, wherein the Court affirmed the
recommendations of the Commissioner, and good cause appearing
therefore, the Court now m^kes and enters the following Order:
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED:
1.

Defendant's request for hearing is denied, the Court
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.

finding that no oralMachine-generated
argumentOCR,is
maynecessary.
contain errors.

n n n 11 Q

2.

Defendant's objection to the recommendations

of the

Commissioner be and is hereby denied, and the recommendations are
affirmed.
3.

The Court incorporates the Findings and Recommended Order

of the Commissioner and adopts the same as its own and incorporates
the same by reference herein.
4.

Defendant's Motion to Amend Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro

Tunc, or in the Alternative, to Modify the Decree of Divorce, is
denied.
5.

Plaintiff

is awarded

judgment against Defendant for

alimony due, owing but unpaid in the sum of $450.00 per month for
the time period commencing eight (8) years next preceding the
filing of Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment and continuing to the
present

time,

which

amount

is

the

amount

of

$81, 239.36,

representing alimony arrearages, including interest, from January
1, 1984 up through and including June 30, 1992.
DATED this 3$

day of

Ud^yu**^

1992.

J A M ^ S . SAWAYA
\'
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
BRENT D. YOUNG
Attorney for Defendant

Date
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER by placing same in the United States
mail, postage prepaid, on thisc^^A day of July, 1992, addressed
to:
BRENT D. YOUNG
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Defendant
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603

Kay J^ Slahfc^sky
gaskill.2ror
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HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247)
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Suite 722 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7444
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
ALBERTA FANNIE GASKILL a/k/a
LEE or LEA GASKILL,

NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR
DECISION AND REQUEST
FOR RULING

Plaintiff,

Civil No. 764923691

v.

Judge James S. Sawaya

DON R. GASKILL,
Defendant.
ooOoo

Plaintiff, LEA GASKILL, by and through her attorney of record,
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN, pursuant to Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial
Administration, respectfully requests a ruling "on t a issue of
attorney's

fees, which was reserved

by the Commissioner

and

presented to the Court by way of Affidavits".
DATED this

day of August, 1992.
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN

HELEN E. CHRISTIAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION AND
REQUEST FOR RULING by placing same in the United States mail,
postage prepaid, on this ~M

day of .July, 1992, addressed to:

BRENT D. YOUNG
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Defendant
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603

Kay J.^Ulahtasfcj
ga8klll.2naub

2
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FILED
fl'STRlcr COURT

SEP

*
>
^ ^>

BRENT D. YOUNG (3584)
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys
for Defendant
48 North University
Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603
Telephone: 375-3000

^ <>
>s. <i
J^

2 JO 27 m '31

BY -II.i^i +/K

.••'.-,

!'-<'-.iU CLERK

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ALBERTA FANNIE GASKILL aka
LEE OR LEA GASKILL,
Plaintiff,
vs.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

DON R. GASKILL,
Civil No. 764923691
Defendant.
TO THE PLAINTIFF:

ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL by and through her

attorney, Helen E. Christian:
Helen E. Christian
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN
Suite 722 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Ut
84111
Notice is hereby given that the defendant and appellant, DON
R. GASKILL, by and through his counsel, Brent D. Young, appeals to
the Utah Court of Appeals of the State of Utah from that final Order
of the Hon. James S. Sawaya, entered in this matter on

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

August 28, 1992.
The appeal is taken from the entire judgment.
Dated:

September /o

, 19^
BRENT D. YOyUGU

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing notice to Helen E. Christian, Attorney for Plaintiff, by
placing it in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, addressed as
follows:
Helen E. Christian
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN
Suite 722 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Ut
84111>/^~)
BRENT D. YOliNC
scnotapp/9.1
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»ISTR!0r COURT

toJS IB n AH'»
BRENT D. YOUNG (3584)
IVIE & YOUNG
WW?
-><^- y
j^^C
Attorneys for Plaintiff
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603
Telephone: 375-3000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ALBERTA FANNIE GASKILL aka
LEE OR LEA GASKILL,
Plaintiff,
COST BOND ON APPEAL
vs.
.DON R. GASKILL,

)

Civil No.

)

Judge:

764923691

James S. Sawaya

Defendant.
Defendant, Don R. Gaskill, in the above-entitled action is
appealing to the Utah Court of Appeals from a decision made and
entered in the above-entitled matter in favor of the defendant.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises, we, the
undersigned, MARGIE ROBBINS and KIMBERLY FIELDING, do hereby
undertake and promise on the part of the appellant and acknowledge
ourselves bound in the sum of $300.00 conditioned to secure the
payment of costs if the appeal is dismissed or the judgment is
modified, and not exceeding the sum of $300.00, and the said MARGIE
ROBBINS and KIMBERLY FIELDING hereby submit themselves to the
jurisdiction of the above-court and irrevocably appoint the clerk of
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said court as their agent upon whom any papers affecting their
liability on this bond may be served and further agree that their
liability may be enforced on motion without the necessity of an
independent action.
Dated:

September

STATE OF UTAH

jry

1992.

)

County of Utah )

ss.

MARGIE ROBBINS and KIMBERLY FIELDING, the sureties whose names
are subscribed to the above undertaking, being severally and duly
sworn, each for themselves, say: That they are a resident and
freeholder in the State and County and are worth the sum in said
undertaking specified as a penalty thereof over and above all their
just debts and liabilities and exclusive of property exempt from
execution.
Dated:

September &

1992.
MARGIE//ROBBINS
TCIftBERLY FIELDING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

y

day of September, 1992,

NOTARY PUBLtC fl
wmnauc
MERLE Y.NYMAN

bond/9.1

746 WM 700 South
fan, UUt 84058
My Comm. Expire 8-2044
Sate of Utah

2
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the / 0 day of September, 1992, I
caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Cost
Bond on Appeal, to Helen Christian, Attorney for Plaintiff, by
placing a copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid,
addressed as follows:
Helen Christian
Attorney at Law
Suite 722 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT
84111

^S&L-//7
BRENT

3

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY I
GASKILL, ALBERTA FANNEY
PLAINTIFF
VS
GASKILL, DON R
DEFENDANT

CASE NUMBER 764923691 DA
DATE 09/29/92
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK STH

TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
•"•%'

P. ATTY.
D. ATTY.

PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES HAVING BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE COURT PURSUANT TO RULE 4-501,
COMES NOW THE COURT AND STATES AS FOLLOWS: I FIND NO >'
RESERVATION OF THE ISSUE OF ATTORNEY FEES, NO ANY AFFIDAVITS,
CC: HELEN E. CHRISTIAN
BRENT D. YOUNG
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ssell VV. Bench
idii}}! Judge

luh M. Billings
•ciiiu- 1'icsiding Judge

^inal VV. Garff
nela T. Greenwood
c

rmau H. Jackson

©taf) Court of appeals
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Clerks'Office 801-578-3950
Administration 801-578-3900

Mary T. Noonan
Clerk ot the Court

:c

Fax 801-578-5999

rgory K. Orme
e

October 2, 1992

>nani H. Russon

«L£aSJSTHjeT COURT
Third Judicial District

OCT 0 5 1992
Brent D. Young
Ivie & Young
Attorneys at Law
48 North University Avenue
P. O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603
In Re:
Alberta Fannie Gaskill aka Lee
or Lea Gaskill,
Plaintiff and Appel"*e,
v.
Don R. Gaskill,
Defendant and Appel nt.

C-.'PuyCl

Case No. 920632-CA

f

Dear Mr. Young:

^y

Please be advised t*at the notice of appeal in this case has
been filed with the Court of Appeals on October 1, 1992. The case
number is 920632-CA and should be indicated on any future filings.
Within ten days of the filing of the Notice of Appeal, Rule
11(e)(1) requires the appellant request from the reporter a
transcript of such parts of the proceedings not already on file as
the appellant deems necessary. The request must be in writing and
directed to the court reporter by name. You must make make
satisfactory arrangements for payment, and file a certificate to
that effect with the clerk of the court from which the appeal is
taken and a copy with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals. Please
be aware that a "no name" request for transcript may sit
indefinitely without being delivered to the reporter. If no such
parts of the proceedings are to be requested, within the same
period the appellant must file a certificate to that effect wit4
the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken and a cop
witn the Clerk of the Court of Appeals. If there is no transcr ,;
request, the clerk shall transmit the index of the record within
20 days, but not sooner than 14 days, after the filing of the
notice of appeal.
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Case No, 920632-CA
October 2, 1992
Page -2-

The Docketing Statement, consisting of the original and three
copies, is due within 21 days of the filing of the notice of
appeal in the trial court, or October 16, 1992,
Sincerely,
^

.

•

'•

/ •

Janice Ray
Deputy Clerk
-^'

cc:

Helen E. Christian
•/Third District, Salt Lake County #764923 691 before
The Honorable James S. Sawaya

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

i)ir,iPic'MU«T
OCT
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN
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GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN
'•• ••-"\
V^MNTY
bv-^
Attorneys for Plaintiff
BY "~^i^-£&.__-—BX ,'. ,';< CLERK
i
Suite 722 Boston Building
"'L™
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7^44
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
00O00

ALBERTA FANNIE GASKILL a/k/a
LEE or LEA GASKILL,

MOTION FOR ORDER IN RE:
SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 764923631

v.
DON R. GASKTLL,

Judge James S. Sciwaya

Defendant.
ooOoo
Plaintiff, by and through her counsel of record, Helen E.
Christian, moves the above-entitled Court for an Order requiring
the Defendant, DON R. GASKILL, to appear before this Court to
answer concerning Defendant's property. This Motion is based upon
the files and records in the above-entitled case, which show that
on the 28th day of August, 1992, Plaintiff recovered judgment
against said Defendant for the sum of $81,239.06, plus interest
until paid, and this Judgment has not been paid and all of the same
is owing at this time.
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DATED this \ 5

Y

of

October, 1992.
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN

HELEN E. "ettRTSTIAlK/

Attorney for Plaintiri^

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct
copy

of

the

foregoing MOTION

FOR ORDER

IN RE: SUPPLEMENTAL

PROCEEDINGS, by placing same in the United States mail, postage
prepaid, on this l ^ d a y of October, 1992, addressed to:
BRENT D. YOUNG
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Defendant
4 8 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603

Slahtask

gaskill.msor
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Plaintiff,
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LAW OFFICES

IYIE A N D Y O U N G
A PARTNERSHIP INCLUDING A PROFESSIONAL

CORPORATION

48 NORTH UNIVERSITY A V E N U E
P.O. BOX 672

D A L L A S H. YOUNG (1892-1971)

PROVO, UTAH 84603

RAY HARDING IVIE (1921-1990)

D A L L A S H. YOUNG, JR.
B R E N T D. YOUNG
JERRY L. REYNOLDS

T E L E P H O N E (801)

RAY PHILLIPS IVIE*

T E L E F A X (801)

S H E R M A N C. YOUNG +

November llf 1992

J E F F E R Y C. PEATROSS

2366-2
Appeal©' f i l e

* A L S O A D M I T T E D IN N E V A D A

Y:.-i;

• A L S O A D M I T T E D IN C O L O R A D O

375-3000

375-3067

, . u.'tosflC*

MOV 1 7 1932
H\

_ ; *.,••.;,.;; w w . * i i

^
Ce^uiy Clark

^

Honorable James S. Sawaya
District Court Judge
Third Judicial District Court
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Re:

Gaskill v. Gaskill, District Court Civil No. 764923691DA
Gaskill v. Gaskill, Court of Appeals Case #920632CA

Dear Judge Sawaya:
On November 11, 1992 I received a letter written to the court on
November 9, 1992 by Helen Christen. I subscribe to the view held
by some that it is completely inappropriate to conduct the court's
business through private correspondence. Unfortunately I am
required to respond in the same fashion to Mrs. Christen's letter
of November 9, 1992.
It seems to me that if Mrs. Christen's client is entitled to
relief, that relief should be solicited pursuant to the Rules of
Civil Procedure, perhaps by the filing of an appropriate motion to
which I could respond.
Sincerely,

BRENT D. YOUNG
BDY:mn
cc: Helen Christen

I
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NOV 1 2 1992
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Clerk

SUITE 722. BOSTON BUILDING
9 EXCHANGE PLACE
*ANK j . GUSTIN
.EN E.CHRISTIAN

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
TELEPHONE (801) 531-7444

HARLEYW. GUSTIN
1902-1977

OF COUNSEL
)MAS R. GRISLEY

FACSIMILE
180I) 531-8685

November 9, 1992

The Honorable James S. Sawaya
District Court Judge
Third Judicial District Court
240 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Re: GASKILL v. GASKILL
Civil No. 764923691DA

..P

Dear Judge Sawaya:
In early August, Mr. Young, counsel for Mr. Gaskill, and I,
representing Mrs. Gaskill, scheduled a telephonic conference with
you regarding the necessity of scheduling a final hearing in the
above-referenced action, inasmuch as you had denied Mr. Young's
objection and affirmed the Commissioner's recommendation. The only
issue on which the Commissioner's ruling was not dispositive was
the issue of attorney's fees, which I raised during that telephonic
conference. Mr. Young indicated that it would be acceptable to him
if I submitted Affidavits as to fees and you made a ruling
thereafter as to my client's request for fees.
On August 17, 1992, I submitted the Affidavits of both my
client and myself as to the issue of attorney's fees and requested
that you make your ruling. I subsequently received your minute
entry dated September 29, 1992, indicating that you could find no
reservation of the issue of attorney's fees nor any Affidavits in
that regard.
I have enclosed copies of the following:
1.
The Findings and Recommended Order wherein the issue of
attorney's fees "is reserved until further hearing of the Court;"
2.
3.
myself.

The Affidavit of Lea Gaskill; and
The Affidavit in Support of Attorney's Fees prepared by
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GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN

The Honorable James S. Sawaya
November 9, 1992
Page 2

If this provides you with sufficient information on which to
make a ruling as to my client's request for attorney's fees, I ask
that you do so. If I can provide any additional information to
you, please so advise.
Thank you for your consideration and courtesy in this regard.
Respectfully,
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN

HELEN E. CHRISTIAN
HEC/kjs
Enc.
cc:

Brent Young (w/out enclosures)
Lea Gaskill
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

^
V,

—
r

MINUTE ENTRY
GASKILL, ALBERTA FANNEY
PLAINTIFF
VS
GASKILL, DON R
DEFENDANT

CASE NUMBER 764923691 DA
DATE 11/12/92
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK STH

TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY.
D. ATTY.

THE ISSUE OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS HAVING BEEN SUBMITTED
TO THE COURT. COMES NOW THE CC'RT AND GRANTS ATTORNEY FEES TO
THE PLAINTIFF IN THE SUM OF $1,280 AND COSTS OF $106.76.
CC: HELEN E. CHRISTIAN
J*
BRENT D. YOUNG
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23S7MCT CflfiRT
Third Judicial District

DEC
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247)
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Suite 722 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7444

0

2 1992

SALT LAKi- CGUNtY

3y£^
*

mputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
-ooOoo-

ALBERTA FANNIE GASKILL a/k/a
LEE or LEA GASKILL,

ORDER AWARDING
ATTORNEY'S FEES

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No, 764923691

DON R. GASKILL,

Judge James S. Sawaya

Defendant.
ooOoo
This matter having come before the Court on Plaintiff's
request for attorney's fees reserved pursuant to an earlier Order
of the Court, Plaintiff, ALBERTA FANNIE GASKILL, represented by her
counsel of record, Helen E. Christian, and Defendant, DON R.
GASKILL, represented by his counsel of record, Brent D. Young, and
the Court having reviewed the Affidavits submitted by Plaintiff and
her counsel, and having reviewed the file and being otherwise fully
advised in the premises, and having made and entered its Minute
Entry of November 12, 1992, the Court now hereby makes and enters
the following Order:
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
Plaintiff is awarded and Defendant is ordered to pay to
Plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of $1,280.00, and costs in
the amount of $106.76, a totaL sum of $1,386.76.
DATED this ^? day of ^NovcmBor-, 1992.".

~)

BY THE COURT i! -

JAMES- SNT SAWAYA
X.,District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES, by placing
same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, on this
of November, 1992, addressed to:
Brent D. Young
IVIE AND YOUNG
Attorney for Defendant
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603

Kay J. Slahtas

gaekill.ord

2
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LOAN
TERM
INTEREST RATE
PAYMENT
TOTAL COST

PERIODS

0
96
0.8333%
450.00
43,200.00

PAYMENT

S P r r r - — - r r ~; = =

42
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44
45
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54
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57
58
59
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61
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66
67
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70
71
72
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74
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oo

INTEREST

29,655.67
10.00%
43,200.00
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-30791.25
656.25
-206.25
450.00
-31443.75
652.50
-202.50
450.00
-32092.50
648.75
-198.75
450.00
-32737.50
645.00
-195.00
450.00
-33378.75
641.25
-191.25
450.00
-34016.25
637.50
-187.50
450.00
-34650.00
633.75
-183.75
450.00
-35280.00
630.00
-180.00
450.00
-35906.25
626.25
-176.25
450.00
-36528.75
622.50
-172.50
450.00
-37147.50
618.75
-168.75
450.00
-37762.50
615.00
-165.00
450.00
-38373.75
611.25
-161.25
450.00
-38981.25
607.50
-157.50
450.00
-39585.00
603.75
-153.75
450.00
-40185.00
600.00
-150.00
450.00
-40781.25
596.25
-146.25
450.00
-41373.75
592.50
-142.50
450.00
-41962.50
588.75
-138.75
450.00
-42547.50
585.00
-135.00
450.00
-43128.75
581.25
-131.25
450.00
-43706.25
577.50
-127.50
450.00
-44280.00
573.75
-123.75
450.00
-44850.00
570.00
-120.00
450.00
556.25
-45416.25
-11&25
450.00
-45978.75
562.50
-112.50
450.00
-46537.50
558.75
-108.75
450.00
-47092.50
555.00
-105.00
450.00
-47643.75
551.25
-101.25
450.00
-48191.25
547.50
-97.50
450.00
-48735.00
543.75
-93.75
450.00
-49275.00
540.00
-90.00
450.00
-49811.25
536.25
-86.25
450.00
-50343.75
532.50
-82.50
450.00
-50872.50
528.75
-78.75
450.00
-51397.50
525.00
-75.00
450.00
-51918.75
521.25
-71.25
450.00
-52436.25
517.50
-67,50
450.00
-52950.00
513.75
-63.75
450.00
-53460.00
510.00
-60.00
450.00
-53966.25
506.25
-56.25
450.00
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450.00
450.00
450.00
450.00
450.00
450.00
450.00
450.00
450.00
450.00
450.00
450.00
450.00

-48.75
-45.00
-41.25
-37.50
-33.75
-30.03
-26.25
-22.50
-18.75
-15.00
-11.25
-7.50
-3.75

498.75
495.00
491.25
487.50
483.75
480.00
476.25
472.50
468.75
465,00
461.25
457.50
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-17460.00
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